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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Religious fundamentalists of all stripes have contributed to, and been
accused of, the perpetuation of terrorism, violence, prejudice, closed-mindedness,
and a rejection of the things the modern world has to offer (Dawkins, 2006;
Harris, 2004; Hitchens, 2007; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Schuefele, Corley,
Shih, Dalrymple, & Ho, 2009; Wellman, 2007). While many theorists have
worked to uncover the psychological mechanisms of these relationships, they
tend to approach this endeavor from the position that fundamentalism is
dysfunctional if not downright anti-social. Fundamentalism, however, has also
been linked to a variety of more benevolent outcomes, like physical and mental
well-being (Genia, 1996; George, Ellison, & Larson, 2002; Pargament, 2002;
Sethi & Seligman, 1993). The current paper attempts to integrate both
“outcomes” of fundamentalism into a single theoretical account.
The Psychology of Fundamentalism
From a psychological perspective religious fundamentalism represents an
adherence to a set of religious teachings that are believed to contain the inerrant
truth about both existential and ethereal existence (Altemeyer & Hunsberger,
1992). More specifically, fundamentalism consists of two primary components.
The first component is closed-mindedness, especially in regards to religious
issues (Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005; Hunsberger, Pratt, & Pancer, 1994;
Pancer, Jackson, Hunsberger, Pratt, & Lea, 1995). For example, fundamentalists
compared to non-fundamentalists, think less complexly about religious issues
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such as abortion (Hunsberger et al., 1994; Pancer et al., 1995) and are less likely
to acknowledge contradictions in religious texts (Altemeyer, 2002). The second
component of fundamentalism is belief in an infallible authority (Hood, Hill, &
Williamson, 2005; Woodberry & Smith, 1998), the focus of most measures and
definitions of fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, 2004; Hood, Hill,
& Williamson, 2005; McFarland, 1989; Woodberry & Smith, 1998).
The two components of fundamentalism might be a result of the theology
of religious fundamentalist groups; however, these two components may also be
especially adept at providing a sense of certainty and cognitive closure. Religious
fundamentalists are found to have higher levels of the need for closure (Brandt &
Reyna, in press; Saroglou, 2002), as well as other similar constructs such as the
intolerance of ambiguity (Budner, 1962) and inconsistency (Feather, 1964),
suggesting that fundamentalists may desire clear cut answers about and
perspectives on the world. Closure can be facilitated by an epistemic authority
(Kruglanski, Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, Sharvit, Ellis et al., 2005), that is, an expert
on the knowledge important for a situation or domain. While an epistemic
authority is often regulated to their domain of expertise—a history teacher to
historical facts, a legal scholar to Supreme Court decisions (Bar-Tal, Raviv,
Raviv, & Brosh, 1991; Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, Biran, & Sela, 2002)—
fundamentalists subscribe to an epistemic authority that not only supersedes
traditional epistemic boundaries, but is also often considered sacred or infallible,
providing absolute truth (Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005; Woodberry & Smith,
1998). Thus, fundamentalists can maintain closure by adhering to, studying, and
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internalizing the teachings from religious sources. These teachings provide an
epistemic authority for most, if not all, of life’s many facets. The clear cut
answers provided by fundamentalism may also contribute to fundamentalisms
positive and negative outcomes.
Fundamentalism and Prejudice
Religious fundamentalism has been related to prejudice towards a variety
of groups including gays and lesbians (Brandt & Reyna, in press; Fulton,
Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999; Jackson & Esses, 1997; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, &
Kirkpatrick, 2002; Mavor & Gallois, 2008; Rowatt, Tsang, Kelly, LaMartina,
McCullers, & McKinley, 2006), radicals (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), single
mothers (Jackson & Esses, 1997), religious outgroups (Rowatt, Franklin, &
Cotton, 2005), and people who do not believe in God (Jackson & Hunsberger,
1999). In sum, fundamentalists reject those who are perceived to violate their
values and beliefs (e.g. Brandt & Reyna, in press; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005;
Jackson & Esses, 1997; Mavor & Gallois, 2008). The root of prejudice by
fundamentalists can be attributed, in part, to authoritarianism (Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 1992; Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010), the perception of non-believers as
an outgroup (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999), and teachings that accept prejudice
within a religious tradition (Jackson & Esses, 1997; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, &
Kirkpatrick, 2002). It is proposed here that one function of religious-based
prejudice may be the protection and maintenance of the cognitive closure
provided by fundamentalism (see also Brandt & Reyna, in press). By rejecting
various groups, fundamentalists are able to discount and reject questions about,
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and attacks on, their worldview, as well as demean the validity of opposing
worldviews.
Fundamentalism may also be related to more psychologically beneficial
outcomes. For example, in one study fundamentalism was related to spiritual and
religious well-being (Genia, 1996). Similarly, members of fundamentalist
religious denominations were more optimistic, more hopeful, and less hopeless
than their counterparts in moderate or liberal denominations (Sethi & Seligman,
1993, 1994). Even the religious materials congregation members were exposed to
in fundamentalist denominations were more optimistic (e.g. sermons, hymns,
scripture readings). These studies also found that fundamentalists attended
worship services more often (Genia, 1996) and were more involved in their
religion (Sethi & Seligman, 1993). These results suggest that there may be
something more to fundamentalism than intolerance, prejudice, and
discrimination. Fundamentalism may be beneficial to both the group and the
individual.
The purpose of the present paper is to integrate past research on the
positive and negative outcomes of religious fundamentalism by linking these
outcomes to the perception of both ingroup and outgroup members along a
continuum of humanness that ranges from the perception of others as less than
human to more than human. This continuum in social cognition is called the
“chain of being” in reference to the philosophical idea of the Great Chain of
Being (Lovejoy, 1936/1964). Specifically, due to the components of
fundamentalism and the concurrent desire to see the world in clear cut terms,
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fundamentalists are suggested to use the perception of others as more or less than
human in order to organize and make sense of their moral universe. In this model,
perception of others along a dimension of humanness is driven by perceived value
similarities and differences of ingroups and outgroups (respectively). For religious
fundamentalists, perceiving the ingroup as upholding and embodying important
values results in seeing the ingroup as more than human (e.g. sanctified), which
inspires group and individual promoting behavior. Conversely, perceiving other
groups as violating religious values threatens the religious ingroup, causing the
ingroup to protect themselves (e.g. discrimination, dehumanization). Figure 1
illustrates the overarching model that guides the current research.
The Chain of Being in Social Cognition
Jonathan Haidt (2003; Haidt & Algoe, 2004) proposed a vertical
dimension to humans’ social cognition. Philosophically rooted in the Great Chain
of Being, this vertical dimension can be anchored in a number of ways depending
on the culture; but in the end, the top of the chain is the ultimate good and the
bottom is the ultimate bad. Using the terms of the environment this could be
conceived as purity (at the top) and pollution (at the bottom), while Christians
could conceptualize it with God (at the top) and Satan (at the bottom). Put simply,
it is a hierarchy of morality anchored by divinity and animality, with humanity
falling somewhere in the middle. Objects, animals, people, saints and deities are
all located someplace on this chain of being, with gradual differences between
each link. Haidt's conceptualization of a chain of being in social cognition was
based upon his work on the moral emotions (Haidt & Algoe, 2004). Specifically,
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Figure 1
Theoretical model of religious fundamentalism and the chain of being.
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disgust, a moral emotion experienced in response to moral violations of divinity
and purity (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt
1999), and elevation, a positive moral emotion experienced in response to
perceived saintly acts (Haidt & Algoe, 2004), were suggested to be experienced
and felt when perceiving others as lower or higher on the chain of being,
respectively. The current research expands on these ideas by linking the chain of
being to research on sanctification and dehumanization.
The idea of the chain of being, however, is not new as Arthur Lovejoy's
(1936/1964; see also Bynum, 1975) quintessential work has traced the idea of the
chain of being from early philosophers to theologians, scientists, and its eventual
fall from favor during the industrial revolution. While this fall from favor may
have been evident in the academic writings of the day, it may have only been
academic. The continuum may still persist in the lay publics' conception and
perception of the social world, allowing people to perceive others and themselves
along the continuum from animal to divine – placing people among the gods, the
great apes, or worse. The current paper attempts to test this possibility.
Current evidence suggests that a chain of being that encapsulates the
perception of others as more or less than human does exist. For example, people
perceive a variety of agents, both supernatural and otherwise (humans, animals),
in terms of their humanity (Demoulin, Saroglou, & Van Pachterbeke, 2008; Gray,
Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008).
Research also indicates that the metaphor of Black men as apes (or primates of
some sort) still persists in the implicit cognition of both whites and non-whites
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(Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008). Additionally, the concepts of goodbad and God-Devil are perceived along a vertical continuum (Meier, Hauser,
Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007; Meier & Robinson, 2004). Overall, this
research points to the existence of a moral chain of being that includes the
perception of others as more or less than human—including perceptions of the
divine and the morally reprehensible. As such, the chain of being consists on the
bottom half of dehumanization (Haslam, 2006), or as some have termed it, infrahumanization (Leyens, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Gaunt, Paladino,
Vaes, et al., 2001). The opposing top half of the chain of being includes the
perception of humans as closer to the Gods and the Saints, even sacred, what
some have called sanctification (Pargament & Mahoney, 2005).
Antecedents of the Chain of Being
Thus far the chain of being has been described as a moral hierarchy—a
continuum of social cognition—which persists in the minds of modern humans. It
may be the case that every person perceives others along this chain of being, but
it is also likely that certain styles of thinking, beliefs, and personality traits
exacerbate the perception of other humans as more or less human. Religious
fundamentalism and the need for closure may be one set of beliefs and cognitive
styles that may contribute to this perception.
The need for closure may be related to the perception of people as more or
less human in order to reduce ambiguity as it is related to the reduction of
ambiguity. Therefore people who are high on need for closure may be motivated
to see people and groups they consider good as greater than human, while people
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and groups they consider bad as less than human. By separating out the good and
the bad on a moral hierarchy people are able to see the world in more distinct and
less ambiguous terms. Religious fundamentalists are more likely to have a high
need for closure (Brandt & Reyna, in press; Saroglou, 2002) and intolerance of
ambiguity (Budner, 1962), so this group of people may be especially likely to use
the chain of being as a guide to perceiving the world.
The beliefs encapsulated by religious fundamentalism may also be related
to the perception of others along the chain of being. For example, belief in an
infallible authority could increase the utilization of the Chain of Being—
especially in regards to one’s own group. By definition, the believer thinks that
the infallible authority is always right, so to the degree that they value what the
authority represents and their desire to see themselves in a positive light (cf.
Diener & Diener, 1996; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999), a person
does his or her best to follow the infallible authority. By approximating the
authority (e.g. via their values, beliefs, behaviors) the person may see him or
herself as akin to or in the favor of the infallible authority. This reasoning likely
does not take place explicitly, nor do people come to such a definitive conclusion.
However believing that you and your ingroup are similar to an infallible authority
may give moral validation to your ingroup (cf. Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, &
Busath, 2007). Indeed, people do reason similarly about themselves and God
(Epeley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, & Cacioppo, 2009), believing that God
agrees with their position on a variety of social and moral issues. Belief that one’s
own group has an infallible source of authority indicates, by extension, that
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religious outgroups do not have the same source of authority. People who do not
submit to the same infallible source of moral authority and instead symbolically
violate the values, morals, and worldview of the ingroup are thus, inherently less
moral. This leads to a view of the outgroup as less pure, holy, or sanctified than
the ingroup, which can in turn justify the exclusion or persecution of the
outgroup.
Dehumanization
Dehumanization and the related process infra-humanization are the
perception of humans as less than fully human (Leyens, Cortes, Demoulin, Fiske,
Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres et al., 2003; Haslam, 2006) and consist of “the denial
of full humanness to others” (Haslam, 2006, p. 252) or the attribution of “an
incomplete human essence” to outgroups (Leyens et al., 2001, p. 396). Some
work has attempted to document why some groups are dehumanized and others
are not. Several cognitive and motivational factors contribute to the perception of
humanity including psychological distance (Opotow, 1990; see also Trope &
Lieberman, 2003) and a lack of empathy (Halpern & Weinstein, 2004). The most
common explanation for the dehumanization of outgroups comes from the social
identity perspective. This perspective suggests that the social categorization
process (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) leads people to attribute less of a human essence
to outgroups than to ingroups (Demoulin, Torres, Perez, Paladino, Pozo, Leyens
et al, 2004). Social categorization may also lead people to perceive outgroups as
threatening entities (Wilder, 1986). Building on this latter suggestion and adding
to the list of factors influencing the perceptions of humanity, the current studies
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suggest the components of religious fundamentalism and its related cognitive
styles—belief in an infallible authority and the need for closure—contribute to
the perception of others as more or less human. The current study is one of the
first to link ideological beliefs (like religious fundamentalism) and cognitive style
to dehumanization (see also Hodson & Costello, 2007).
The current theoretical perspective posits that dehumanization can serve a
function for religious fundamentalists. Specifically, it is theorized that
dehumanization—and the discriminatory behaviors that follow—help to protect
the validity and vitality of the beliefs of fundamentalists. This should especially
be the case for groups who are perceived to violate important religious values and
beliefs (Brandt & Reyna, in press; Jackson & Esses, 1997; see also Reyna,
Brandt, Viki, & Hughes, 2010; Henry & Reyna, 2007), and thus threaten them
(Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). This reasoning is consistent with research that
suggests that prejudice and discrimination directed towards members of groups
that violate norms and traditions can be used to bolster one’s cultural worldview
(Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Greenberg, Pyszczynski,
Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kirkland et al., 1990; Solomon, Greenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 2000). In a similar manner, the fundamentalist worldview may be
protected through dehumanization and prejudice. Figure 2 illustrates the
protective function of dehumanization and discrimination for religious
fundamentalists.
To be clear, the current model suggests that religious fundamentalists will
only demonstrate prejudice and discrimination towards value violating groups.
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For example, research has documented a relationship between fundamentalism
and implicit prejudice towards gays (Rowatt & Franklin, 2004). Gays are
perceived to violate traditional family values (Henry & Reyna, 2007); religious
fundamentalists find this value to be important, so therefore fundamentalists show
prejudice towards gays. Conversely, fundamentalism is not related to implicit
prejudice towards Blacks (Rowatt, Tsang, Kelly, LaMartina, McCullers, &
McKinley, 2006) and Blacks do not necessarily violate values and beliefs of the
religious. While there may be third variables that appear to connect
fundamentalism and prejudice towards Blacks (e.g. political conservatism)
fundamentalism itself is not predicted to be the cause of anti-Black prejudice (see
also, Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010).
Sanctification
Sanctification is “a process through which aspects of life are perceived as
having divine character and significance” (Pargament & Mahoney, 2005, p. 183).
In terms of the chain of being, sanctification refers to the perception of people or
groups as more than human, if not divine. Perceiving people as good and right,
even sacred, can be a very positive thing. Haidt (2003) described people who
experienced the emotion of elevation as having a desire to help other people and
to make the world a better place. Sanctification is related to the promotion of
sanctified values and behaviors. For example, people who sanctify the
environment are more likely to make donations to environmental causes
(Tarakeshwar et al., 2001); people who sanctify their marriages are more likely to
have stable marriages (Mahoney et al., 2003); and people who sanctify their
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Figure 2
Theoretical model of the protective function of religious fundamentalism.
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strivings are more likely to spend time on those goals (Mahoney, Pargament et al.,
2005). In general, the sanctification of values and relationships promotes these
values and relationships. Similarly, it would be expected that groups who uphold
one’s values would be sanctified; thus, the sanctified group would be more likely
to receive support for its values and relationships.
The perception of one’s group as sacred may have beneficial
psychological outcomes that serve to promote the individual well-being of group
members, but also the group’s goals. Identification with a relevant group is
beneficial to an individual’s psychological well-being, including self-esteem
(Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Bizumic, Reynolds, Turner, Bromhead, &
Subasic, 2009; Outten, Schmitt, Garcia, & Branscombe, 2009; Verkuyten &
Hagendoorn, 2002), life-satisfaction (Outten et al., 2009), positive affect
(Bizumic et al, 2009), and other health related behaviors (Haslam, Jessten,
Postmes, & Haslam, 2009), suggesting that perceptions of one’s group is integral
to the perception of the self. Research has also suggested that identification with a
group leads one to act on their group’s behalf, whether that is collective action for
low-status groups (Derks, van Laar, & Ellemers, 2009) or support for the current
status hierarchy for high-status groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Other relevant
group memberships, such as those in the workplace, can also lead to more work
involvement (Bizumic et al., 2009). For religious fundamentalists it would be
expected that sanctification would predict individual well-being, as well as
support for the group in terms of worship service attendance, donations, volunteer
service, and other group serving behaviors. In this sense, sanctification may be a
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special case of ingroup favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and identification. This
theorizing suggests the theoretical model in Figure 3 for the promotion function
of religious fundamentalism. It is important to consider sanctification as past
research on dehumanization and infra-humanization has primarily assumed that
the perception of a person or group as human was the top of a continuum between
animality and humanity (Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al, 2001, 2003; but see
Demoulin et al., 2008; Haslam et al., 2008). This one sided focus may be
detrimental to understanding the full capacity and complexity of humans’
psychologies. For example, measures of humanness may not successfully capture
the perception of a person or group as more than human. Indeed, infrahumanization seems to be related more to outgroup derogation than ingroup
favoritism (Viki & Calitri, 2008); however this may be because the measure used
was not sufficient to detect sanctification.
Importantly, the effects of sanctification are theorized to go above and
beyond mere positive feelings and include a moral aspect that connects the
sanctified target with the divine. Thus, while sanctification and positivity are
likely correlated it is important to demonstrate that perceptions of sanctification
are predictive above positive affect and similar constructs. One study has
examined the independent impact of sanctification and positivity. In a sample of
heterosexual undergraduate college students imbuing sex with sacred qualities
(e.g. holy, spiritual, blessed) was related to increased levels of sexual behavior
(including intercourse), and more positive reactions to sexual intercourse after
controlling for general positive attitudes towards sex (N. Murray-Swank,
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Figure 3
Theoretical model of the promotion function of religious fundamentalism.
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Pargament, & Mahoney, 2005). Other evidence suggests that vertical perceptions
of the divine are independent of likability (Meier et al., 2007). Overall this
research suggests that sanctification is more than general positive regard and
includes connections with the divine.
The protection and promotion functions associated with the
dehumanization and sanctification aspects of the chain of being have been
presented here as easily separable consequences of fundamentalists’ perception of
humans along the chain of being. However, these consequences cannot always be
so easily disentangled, as these two functions can work in tandem. For example,
in terms of the environment, donating money to an environmental protection
agency promotes the environment by investment, but that investment also serves
to indirectly protect the environment. Similarly, protection and promotion may
not be easy to disentangle for religious fundamentalists. Opposition to gay
marriage not only protects religious fundamentalists’ conception of family values,
it can also provide media attention that may serve to recruit members and bolster
a sense of legitimacy (i.e. promotion).
Divinity Differential
The difference between ingroups and outgroups on the chain of being
leads to one of the more unique predictions utilizing the chain of being. The
difference between an ingroup and an outgroup on the chain of being is called
here the “divinity differential” and is proposed to be the result of perceived
differences and threats to an ingroup’s values. Furthermore, the divinity
differential is expected to mediate the relationship between value violations and
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efforts to protect the ingroup. This proposition is consistent with recent research
demonstrating that greater perceptions of human-animal similarity is related to
less extreme actions taken against the outgroup (Costello & Hodson, 2010). The
divinity differential is also consistent with research suggesting that perceived
differences in attitudes predict less cooperative, and greater competitive, behavior
in an effort to solve differences (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008). The logic of the chain
of being expands past dehumanization research and suggests that the differences
in perceptions of ingroups and outgroups represented by the divinity differential
can take place anywhere along the continuum of the chain of being. Rather than a
focus on humanity as a starting point, such that only groups falling below
“human” face discrimination, the divinity differential and the chain of being
suggest that greater ingroup-outgroup differences, whether those differences are
above or below the conceptual midpoint of “human,” result in greater protection.
Rationale (Study 1)
The purpose of the present studies was to test the hypotheses related to the
chain of being (Study 1), especially in regards to religious fundamentalism (Study
2). The primary goal of Study 1 was to assess whether people perceived other
groups (Blacks/African-Americans, Christians, Gays), animals, and supernatural
beings (God and Satan) along a chain of being—from less than to more than
human. Participants rated a variety of target groups and entities on measures of
sanctification (Mahoney, Pargament, Murray-Swank, & N. Murray-Swank, 2003)
and humanness (Haslam & Bain, 2007; Haslam, Bain, Douge, Less, & Bastian,
2005). While other studies have used a variety of target entities, including
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supernatural agents, animals, and humans (Demoulin et al., 2008; Gray, Gray, &
Wegner, 2007; Haslam et al., 2008) these studies have primarily focused on how
these entities can be described in terms of human characteristics. The current
study extends this type of inquiry by including a measure of sanctification, which
goes beyond past research that has assumed that the perception of a person or
group as human was the top of a continuum between animality and humanity (e.g.
Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al, 2001, 2003). The use of measures to assess the
sanctification of an ingroup can help determine if people are capable of
sanctifying the ingroup.
Study 1 also assessed the emotions associated with perceptions of
humanness and sanctification. Haidt and his colleagues (2003; Haidt & Algoe,
2004) have suggested that disgust is related to the perception of people as below
human on a chain of being and that more positive moral emotions (e.g. elevation,
admiration) are related to the perception of people as more than human. Three
negative (i.e. disgust, anger, contempt) and three positive (i.e. awe, admiration,
and gratitude) moral emotions were measured and compared to the measures of
humanness and sanctification. Based on the work by Haidt and colleagues, it was
predicted that the more a person or group is perceived as sanctified and human
the less anger, disgust, and contempt will be directed towards them. The more a
person is perceived as sanctified the more admiration, gratitude, and awe will be
directed towards them. The potential relationship between humanness and
positive moral emotions is unclear because humanness may not represent the
perception of others as more than human. It is important to note that while many
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scholars have used measures of emotions as proxies of dehumanization (Esses,
Veenviet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008; Maoz & McCauley, 2008; Taylor, 2007), there
has not been any research examining how felt emotions relate to measures of
humanness. Thus the current research will be able to assess the appropriateness of
the comparison of different measures of humanness and dehumanization to
emotions.
Finally, the last portion of Study 1 contained a preliminary examination of
a measure intended to assess perceptions along the chain of being more directly.
Similar to the classic feeling thermometer or the ladder of subjective social status
(Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, Ickovics, 2000), this measure of the chain of being
asked participants to rate their perception of a variety of target groups on a scale
of zero to 100 with zero labeled as the ultimate evil and 100 labeled as the
ultimate good. Importantly, this measure was displayed as a vertical continuum to
highlight the proposed vertical nature of perceptions of groups along the chain of
being (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4
Moral thermometer used in Studies 1 and 2.

Statement of Hypotheses (Study 1)
As illustrated throughout the previous section several hypotheses can be
derived from the proposed model of the chain of being. The hypotheses that will
be tested in Study 1 will be formally restated.
Hypothesis I
Hypothesis Ia. Independent of general positive regard, target groups will
be perceived along a dimension of sacredness according to their position on a
chain of being, such that God will be perceived as the most sacred, the Devil as
the least sacred, the human groups someplace in the middle, and animals slightly
lower than the human groups. The self was predicted to fall someplace between
the human groups and God, because humans, especially from Western cultures,
tend to self-enhance (Diener & Diener, 1996; Heine, Lehman, Markus, &
Kitayama, 1999).

22
Hypothesis Ib. Independent of general positive regard, target groups will
be perceived along a dimension of humanness according to their position in a
chain of being, such that the Devil will be perceived as the least human, the
human groups will be perceived someplace in the middle, and animals will be
perceived someplace between the Devil and the human groups. Again, the self
will be perceived as slightly more human than the human target groups.
Importantly, no specific prediction is made about God. While God is theorized to
be perceived as more than human along a chain of being, past research suggests
that measures of humanness do not capture the perception of targets as more than
human. That is, the items used to measure humanness might not apply to God.
Hypothesis II
Despite the general tendency for human groups to be perceived near the
middle of the chain of being it is expected that an ingroup will be perceived as
more human and more sacred than outgroups.
Hypothesis III
Hypothesis IIIa. The perception of a target group as sacred will be related
to greater feelings of awe, gratitude, and admiration and less feelings of disgust,
anger, and contempt towards that target group.
Hypothesis IIIb. The perception of a target group as human will be related
to less feelings of disgust, anger, and contempt directed towards that target group.
There are no specific predictions regarding humanness and the positive moral
emotions.
Exploratory Research Questions
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If the moral thermometer is used in place of the measures of humanness
and sacredness, how do the results using the moral thermometer compare to the
humanness and sacredness results? How do differences between ingroups and
outgroups on the moral thermometers predict perceived humanness, sacredness,
and the expression of moral emotions?
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CHAPTER II
METHODS (STUDY 1)
In the first study, participants completed an online survey that included
measures of humanness, sanctification, and six moral emotions (i.e. anger,
disgust, contempt, awe, gratitude, and admiration) as experienced in relation to
eight target groups.
Participants
A total of 339 participants were recruited from an urban Midwestern
university for partial course credit in an introductory psychology course. After
removing participants who did not respond to a substantial portion of the survey
(i.e. more than 50% of the survey was incomplete), there were a total of 333
participants (98 men, 233 women, 2 other/no report) who ranged in age from 16
to 50 years old (M=20, SD=3.17). There were 232 participants who identified as
White/Caucasian, 42 as Latino/a, 16 as African-American/Black, 43 as other
ethnicities or multiracial. Two hundred and eleven participants identified as
Christian, 71 as not religious, and 51 as other religious identifications (e.g. Sikh,
Agnostic).
Procedures
Subjects were directed to a website with a consent form. If participants
consented to participate in the study they were taken to the survey’s website,
where they completed ten sets of measures as well as demographic information.
The questionnaire was designed to include eight primary target entities as eight
within-subject variables. The primary target entities included God, Devil, Self,
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Animals, Whites/Caucasians, Blacks/African-Americans, Christians, and Gays.
After completing the survey the participants were taken to a debriefing webpage.
Measures
Complete measures can be found in Appendix A.
After completing demographic information participants were asked to
complete a thermometer styled rating scale in regards to ten target entities
including the entities of primary interest to this study. For every entity listed the
participants rated the entity from zero to 100, where 100 indicated very favorable
feelings and zero indicated very unfavorable feelings. This measure served as a
control variable to help rule out the alternative explanation of positive affect. The
additional entities were Terrorists and Saints. These two groups were included for
the extra information they could provide about the chain of being in relation to
the new chain of being measure—the moral thermometer (see below).
Following the feeling thermometer participants completed measures of
humanness, sanctification and moral emotions for the eight primary target
entities. For each entity participants completed five sanctification items, six
humanness items, and six moral emotion items. All items were completed on a
seven point scale ranging from 1=Not at all to 7=Very much. The sanctification
and humanness items were presented in the same sequence. Participants were
asked “To what extent do you characterize Yourself with the following traits?”
where “Yourself” was subsequently replaced with each of the target entities. The
five sanctification items were derived from Mahoney and colleagues (Mahoney,
Pargament, A. Murray-Swank, & N. Murray-Swank, 2003) measure of
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sanctification and included Awesome, Inspiring, Heavenly, Sacred, and Blessed.
The six humanness items were taken from Haslam and colleagues work on
perceptions of humanness (Haslam & Bain, 2007; Haslam et al., 2005). Three
positive and three negative characteristics were chosen that were rated in previous
studies as being uniquely human, but not human nature. This was done to select
words that most clearly represented characteristics that separate humans from
animals. The six items were Broadminded, Conscientious, Humble, Disorganized,
Rude, and Stingy. Reliabilities of the sanctification and humanness measures for
each target entity are presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Cronbach’s Alpha (α) for measures of humanness and sanctification.

Target Entity
You
God
Devil
Animals

α
.46
.62
.63
.76

You
God
Devil
Animals

α
.83
.97
.86
.91

Humanness
Target Entity
Whites/Caucasians
Blacks/African-Americans
Gays
Christians
Sanctification
Whites/Caucasians
Blacks/African-Americans
Gays
Christians

α
.80
.70
.70
.63
α
.91
.92
.91
.95

After completing measures of sanctification and humanness participants
responded to six items regarding moral emotions experienced in regards to the
target entities. The six moral emotions examined were contempt, anger, disgust,
gratitude, awe, and admiration. Participants were asked “To what extent do you
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feel contempt for Yourself?” where “contempt” and “Yourself” were subsequently
replaced with the five remaining moral emotions and seven remaining target
entities, respectively.
Finally participants completed the new measure of the chain of being.
Similar to the feeling thermometer completed earlier in the survey, participants
were asked to rate ten target groups on a scale from zero to 100 where zero
indicated the ultimate evil and 100 indicated the ultimate good. An integral part of
this measure is a picture of a vertical line connecting the Ultimate Good on the
top and the Ultimate Evil on the bottom (see Figure 4, p. 19). This vertical
illustration aims to capture the vertical metaphor, if not perceptual reality (cf.
Meier et al., 2007) of the chain of being. Two additional groups, saints and
terrorists, were added in order to examine additional “links” on the chain of being.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS (STUDY 1)
The first and second hypotheses suggest that there will be evidence of a
chain of being in social cognition with both the measure of sacredness
(Hypothesis Ia) and humanness (Hypothesis Ib) while holding constant general
positive regard towards the target entities. Furthermore it was predicted that this
evidence would vary by participants’ ingroups (Hypothesis II). To test this latter
hypothesis participants’ ingroup was defined by their religious (Christian or nonChristian) or ethnic/racial (White or Non-White) self-categorization. To test the
predictions of the chain of being an 8 (Target Entities) X 2 (Religion: Christian or
Non-Christian) X 2 (Ethnicity: White or Non-White) linear mixed-model with the
first factor as a within-subjects factor was analyzed for each of the dependent
measures while controlling for general affect directed towards each of the eight
target groups. In this analysis, main effects of Target Entity indicated tests of
Hypothesis I and interactions of Target Entity and the identification (religious and
ethnic) factors indicated tests of Hypothesis II. Ninety-five percent confidence
intervals were used to compare target groups.
Hypothesis I
Hypothesis Ia
Hypothesis Ia suggests that target groups will be perceived along a
dimension of sacredness according to their position on a chain of being, such that
God would be perceived as the most sacred, the Devil as the least sacred, the
human groups someplace in the middle, and animals slightly lower than the
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human groups. The self was predicted to fall someplace between the human
groups and God. There was a significant main effect for target entity on perceived
sacredness, F(7, 327.22)=484.17, p <.001 (Top Panel, Figure 5)1. In support of
the chain of being participants perceived God (M = 5.63, SE = .07) as
significantly more sacred than all of the other target entities. The Devil (M = 1.28,
SE = .05) was perceived as the least sacred compared to all of the other target
entities. The self (M = 4.42, SE = .07) was perceived as significantly more sacred
than all of the target entities except for God, where the self was perceived as
significantly less sacred. The human target entities were perceived towards the
middle of the chain of being. There were, however, differences between the four
human targets. Specifically, Whites (M = 3.75, SE = .08) and Gays (M = 3.80, SE
= .08) were perceived as significantly less sacred than Blacks (M = 3.98, SE =
.09) and Christians (M = 4.07, SE = .08). Finally, contrary to the predictions of
the chain of being, Animals (M = 4.33, SE = .10) were perceived as significantly
more sacred than any of the human groups (but not the self).
Hypothesis Ib
Hypothesis Ib suggests that target groups would be perceived along a dimension
of humanness according to their position along a chain of being, such that the
Devil would be perceived as the least human, the human groups would be
perceived someplace in the middle, and animals would be perceived someplace
between the Devil and human groups. The self was predicted to be perceived as
slightly more human than the human groups. There were not specific predictions
made about God. There was a significant main effect for target entity on
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Figure 5
Estimated sacredness (top panel) and humanness (bottom panel) means for the
eight target entities.

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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perceived humanness, F(7, 321.82) = 62.55, p < .001 (Bottom Panel, Figure 5). In
support of the hypotheses of the chain of being, the Devil (M = 2.68, SE = .07)
was perceived as the least human. Animals (M = 3.02, SE = .08) were perceived
as significantly more human than the Devil, but less human than the human target
entities. The self (M = 4.24, SE = .05) was perceived as the most human. God and
the human groups were perceived in between the self and the animals. Blacks (M
= 3.79, SE = .06) and Gays (M = 3.69, SE = .06) were perceived as more human
than God (M = 3.43, SE = .06), Christians (M = 3.47, SE = .06), and Whites (M =
3.48, SE = .07), who were all perceived as equally human.
Hypothesis I Summary
When examining both the measure of humanness and the measure of
sacredness one can find evidence for a chain of being in the perception of social
groups, animals, and supernatural beings. In general, the results suggest that
humans are attributed a moderate amount of humanness and sacredness, which
places them at the middle of the proposed chain of being. As expected the Devil
was attributed the lowest levels of humanness and sacredness suggesting that the
Devil falls at the bottom of the chain of being. On the other end of the chain of
being, God was perceived with the most sacredness, though only a moderate
amount of humanness.
The results that indicate that God was perceived as merely human suggest that
the measure of humanness may not effectively capture the perception of groups
and Gods as more than human.
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The primary unexpected finding comes from the ratings of animals. For
the humanness measure animals conformed to expectations falling somewhere
between the Devil and the human groups. However, contrary to the hypothesis
animals were attributed more sacredness than the human groups.
Hypothesis II
Hypothesis II suggested that perceptions of the target groups on measures
of sanctification and humanness would be moderated by participants’ religious
and ethnic identification, such that participants would perceive their ingroups as
more human and more sacred than outgroups.
Sacredness
Christians (M = 4.04, SE = .06) tended to perceive the other target entities
as more sacred than non-Christians (M = 3.77, SE = .08), as indicated by a main
effect for the religious identification factor, F(1, 340.76) = 7.04, p = .008. This
main effect was qualified by the significant interaction between the target entities
and religious affiliation, F(7, 348.78) = 5.33, p < .001 (Top Panel, Figure 6). An
examination of the parameter estimates reveals that this interaction was driven by
a significant interaction between religious affiliation and the Christian target (B =
.25, SE = .11, p = .03). This interaction indicates that the perception of sacredness
of the target entities depends on one’s religious affiliation. Consistent with
predictions, Christians perceived Christians (M = 4.46, SE = .10) as significantly
more sacred than non-Christians perceived Christians (M = 3.68, SE = .14).
Indeed, Christians perceived Christians as more sacred than any of the other
human groups, providing some evidence that ingroups are perceived as more
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Figure 6
Estimated sacredness means for the eight target entities as a function of
religious(top panel) and ethnic (bottom panel) identification.

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

34
sacred than outgroups. There was also a marginally significant interaction
between religious affiliation and the Devil target (B = -.20, SE = .11, p = .07),
such that non-Christians (M = 1.34, SE = .07) perceived the Devil as more sacred
than Christians (M = 1.21, SE = .05).
There was also a significant main effect for the ethnicity factor, F(1,
332.76) = 11.78, p = .001, such that non-Whites (M = 4.08, SE = .09) perceived
the target entities with more sacredness overall than Whites (M = 3.73, SE = .06).
This main effect was qualified by an interaction between the target entities and
participant ethnicity, F(7, 331.87) = 4.54, p < .001 (Bottom Panel, Figure 6). This
was primarily driven by the Devil target (B = .32, SE = .11, p = .004). There was
no difference between non-Whites (M = 1.23, SE = .08) and Whites (M = 1.33, SE
= .05) when the Devil was the target entity. However, for all other target entities
non-Whites perceived more sacredness than Whites for all groups. This pattern of
results provides ambiguous evidence for the impact of an ingroup on the
perception of sacredness. While Whites (M = 3.83, SE = .10) perceived Blacks as
less sacred than did non-Whites (M = 4.13, SE = .15), Whites (M = 3.65, SE =
.09) perceived other Whites as less sacred than did non-Whites (M = 3.85, SE =
.14). The perception of Blacks and Whites did not differ for Whites, but nonWhites perceived Blacks as more sacred than Whites. Thus it appears that nonWhites perceive other non-Whites (i.e. Blacks) as more sacred than the White
outgroup. This pattern of results, however, is not significant in White participants.
For the sacred measure there were no other significant interactions. The
interaction between religion and ethnicity was marginally significant, F(1,
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331.48) = 3.70, p = .06. This interaction suggests that for Whites, non-Christians
(M = 3.50, SE = .09, 95% CI 3.33, 3.67) attributed less sacredness overall
compared to Christians (M = 3.97, SE = .07, 95% CI 3.83, 4.10). However for
non-Whites, non-Christians (M = 4.04, SE = .14, 95% CI 3.77, 4.32) attributed
the same degree of sacredness as Christians (M = 4.12, SE = .10, 95% CI 3.92,
4.32).
Humanness
There was no significant main effect for participants’ religion, F(1,
339.09) = 1.89, p = .17, however there was a significant interaction effect, F(7,
342.99) = 5.41, p < .001 (Figure 7). This was primarily driven by the interaction
with the Devil target (B = .30, SE = .10, p = .003). Christians attributed more
humanness to the Devil (M = 3.04, SE = .08) than did non-Christians (M = 2.33,
SE = .11). Unlike the measure of sacredness, the measure of humanness did not
appear to capture ingroup-outgroup differences for Christians and non-Christians.
There was a main effect of ethnicity on the attribution of humanness, F(1,
331) = 12.22, p = .001, such that non-Whites (M = 3.61, SE = .06) attributed more
humanness to the target entities than did Whites (M = 3.34, SE = .04). There were
no other significant main or interaction effects.
Hypothesis II Summary
Overall, the tests for Hypothesis II suggest that one’s group membership
can impact their perception of other people, animals, and supernatural entities in
terms of humanness and sacredness. The specific hypotheses of the chain of
being, however, received only limited support. Ingroup and outgroup differences
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Figure 7
Estimated humanness means for the eight target entities as a function of religious
identification.

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

37
were only manifest on the measure of sacredness when examining attributions of
sacredness as a function of religious identificaiton. It may be that perceiving
people along the chain of being is especially tied to religious reasoning, an idea
consistent with the theorizing in this paper on religious fundamentalism. Nonwhites did percieve Blacks as more sacred than Whites; however, it is difficult to
tell if this effect reflects ingroup favoritism as the sample only consisted of 16
African-American/Black participants. The lack of clear ingroup-outgroup
differences as a function of ethnicity was unexpected.
The humanness measure also provided little support of Hypothesis II.
There were no differences in perceptions of humanness as a function of ethnicity;
however, there was one interaction with the Devil target. This interaction
suggested that Christians were more likely to attribute humanness to the Devil
than were non-Christians. While this interaction does not provide support for the
a priori hypothesis, it does suggest that people may differentially utilize the chain
of being. Specifically, Christians, who are more likely to believe that the Devil is
an active force in the universe, may be more likely to attribute human
characteristics to the Devil than are non-Christians, who are less likely to believe
the Devil plays a role in the world, if they even believe the Devil exists. This
suggests that perceptions of agency may play a role in a entities placement along
the chain of being (cf. Gray, Gray, & Wegener, 2007).
Hypothesis III
The third hypothesis suggests that the perception of groups as sacred will
be related to higher levels of positive moral emotions such as awe, gratitude, and
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admiration and lower levels of negative moral emotions such as contempt,
disgust, and anger. Similarly the measure of humanness was predicted to be
negatively related to contempt, disgust, and anger. No specific hypotheses were
made about the relationship between humanness and the positive moral emotions.
The third hypothesis was tested by examining the relationships between the chain
of being measures (sacredness and humanness) and the six moral emotions while
partialing out positive affect. The results of these analyses are presented in Figure
8. Each bar in Figure 8 represents the partial correlation between the humanness
or sacredness measure and the listed moral emotion. Each bar within each moral
emotion represents a different target group.
The top panel of Figure 8 illustrates the partial correlations of perceived
sacredness and the six moral emotions while controlling for general affect. The
measure of sacredness was consistently and significantly related to the three
positive moral emotions (M r = .43). The results for the negative moral emotions
were more mixed (M r = -.01). While several correlations were in the predicted
negative direction, many were non-significant and several others were significant
in the positive direction. All of the significant positive correlations resulted from
the measure of contempt, which suggests that there may be something particular
to contempt contributing to this pattern of results. Anger, in general, was not
significantly related to perceptions of sacredness. However, for Christians, it was
significantly negatively related to sacredness, with the exception of God (albiet
non-significantly). Finally, the disgust measure was the most reliable negative
emotion predictor of sacredness, with significant results for both Animals and
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Figure 8
Partial correlations between perceptions of sacredness (top panel) and
humanness (bottom panel) and the six moral emotions for each of the eight target
entities.
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Christians and non-significant results that trended in the predicted direction for all
other target entities. The bottom panel of Figure 8 illustrates the partial
correlations of perceived humanness and the six moral emotions while controlling
for general affect. The results for the humanness measure were varied.
Humanness was positively related to the positive moral emotions except for the
self and (for admiration) the Devil (M r = .23). The negative moral emotions were
all either non-significantly or significantly positively related to humanness, which
is contrary to Hypothesis IIIb (M r = .13).
Hypothesis III Summary
With the exception of contempt, the measure of sanctification was, in
general, related to the moral emotions in the predicted manner. This is important,
because these emotions are often considered proxies for the perception of others
as less than, and more than, human (Haidt & Algoe, 2004; Maoz & McCauley,
2008; Taylor, 2007).Thus, it may be the case that the measure of sanctification
more clearly captured the chain of being dimension compared to the measure of
humanness.
While not predicted, the measure of humanness was consistently related to
the three positive moral emotions. Unexpectedly, and contrary to predictions, for
several target entities it was also positively related to the three negative moral
emotions. The cause of this unexpected pattern of results is unclear. It is possible
that for a group to be the recipient of moral emotions it first must be considered at
least partially human (e.g. have agency and intention) and thus worthy of moral
consideration (cf. Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Haslam, 2006); however this is
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contrary to fMRI research that suggests than dehumanized groups elicit feelings
of disgust (Harris & Fiske, 2006).
Exploratory Questions
The secondary purpose of Study 1 was to examine the use of a moral
thermometer as an alternate measure of the chain of being. The moral
thermometer could potentially provide a method to capture the perceptions of
people as above and below human using a single measure---something current
measures of humanness do not accomplish. Moreover, the measure is very brief
and thus a potential easy to use method of capturing dehumanization and
sanctification. First, the relationship between the moral thermometer and the
measures of sacredness and humanness for each of the target groups was
assessed. Following these analyses the hypotheses analyzed with the humanness
and sacredness measures will be tested, along with a preliminary examination of
the divinity differential.
Figure 9 contains the Pearson correlations for each of the target groups for
both the measure of humanness and sacredness when predicting ratings on the
moral thermometer. The moral thermometer was a consistent predictor of the
measure of sacredness (M r = .43). Judging by the absolute value of the
correlations it can be seen that on average the moral thermometer is a better
predictor of the sacredness measure than the humanness measure. However on
average the moral thermometer is a significant positive predictor of the
humanness measure (M r = .17), suggesting that the moral thermometer captures
at least some aspects of humanity of most of the target groups.
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Figure 9
Correlations between perceptions of sacredness, humanness and the moral
thermometer for each of the eight target entities.

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Hypotheses I and II. In order to re-explore Hypotheses I and II, the same
analytic strategy was used as above. Specifically, a 10 (Target Entities) X 2
(Religion: Christian or Non-Christian) X 2 (Ethnicity: White or Non-White)
linear mixed-model with the first factor as a within-subjects factor was analyzed
with the moral thermometer as the dependent measure, while controlling for
general affect directed towards each of the eight target groups. As before, a main
effect of target group was a test of Hypothesis I and interactions between
religious or ethnic identity and target groups were tests of Hypothesis II.
There was a main effect of target entity on perceived level of morality, F(9.
327.81) = 501.47, p < .001 (Figure 10). Results from this analysis largely support
the predictions of the chain of being. God was perceived as the most moral (M =
85.40, SE = 1.08) and the Devil as the least moral (M = 5.83, SE = .95). Terrorists
(M = 10.23, SE = .93) were perceived as more moral than the Devil, but less
moral than all other target entities. Gays (M = 64.58, SE = 1.13) and Christians
(M = 65.90, SE = 1.13) were the least moral of the human target groups. Blacks
(M = 67.37, SE = 1.06) were significantly more moral than gays, but not
significantly different than Christians. Whites (M = 69.52, SE = 1.06) were
perceived as the most moral human group. The Self (M = 75.15, SE = 1.07),
Saints (M = 77.07, SE = 1.31), and Animals (M = 77.85, SE = 1.10) were all
similarly moral. However, Animals were significantly more moral than the self,
and saints did not differ from the self or animals. There were no other main
effects.
There was a significant interaction between the target groups and religion
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Figure 10
Estimated moral thermometer means for the ten target entities.

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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factor, F(9, 347.53) = 2.49, p = .009 (Figure 11). Christian participants (M =
68.79, SE = 1.38) perceived Christians as more moral than did non-Christians (M
= 63.00, SE = 1.86), however this was only marginally significant (B = 2.17, SE =
1.26, p = .09). There was a significant interaction between religious identification
and the Devil target (B = -3.31, SE = 1.47, p = .03). Non-Christians (M = 8.41, SE
= 1.53) perceived the Devil as more moral than did Christians (M = 3.24, SE =
1.14).
Finally, there was a significant 3-way interaction between target group,
religion, and ethnicity, F(9, 328.06) = 2.14, p = .03 (Figure 12). The 3-way
interaction suggests that non-Whites who are Christian (M = 75.28, SE = 2.64)
and non-Whites who are non-Christians (M = 78.64, SE = 3.62) perceive Saints
similarly. However for Whites, non-Christians (M = 71.72, SE = 2.38) perceive
saints as significantly less moral than Christians (M = 82.65, SE = 1.77).
Hypothesis III. The same analysis of partial correlations as with the
sacredness and humanness measures was conducted with the moral thermometer
(Figure 13). The results primarily resemble the results from the measure of
sacredness such that for a majority of the target groups the positive moral
emotions were positively related to the moral thermometer (M pr = .17). Again,
there was no relationship between the moral emotions and the moral thermometer
for the Devil, perhaps due to floor effects. Results were less conclusive for the
negative moral emotions (M pr = -.05). None of the correlations were
significantly in the opposite direction, but many (especially for contempt) were
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Figure 11
Estimated moral thermometer means for the ten target entities as a function of
religious identification.

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 12
Estimated moral thermometer means for the ten target entities as a function of
religious and ethnic identification.

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 13
Partial correlations between the moral thermometer and the six moral emotions
for each of the eight target entities.

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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trending in that direction. For several groups (i.e. God, Gays, and Christians),
especially with the disgust and anger measures, there were significant negative
correlations, as predicted. Thus, the moral thermometer and the sanctification
measure displayed similar relationships among the moral emotions. While the
sanctification measure resulted in larger effect sizes than the moral thermometer
for the positive moral emotions (see Figure 9), the moral thermometer was a more
consistent predictor of negative moral emotions than the sacredness measure.
This analysis suggests that the moral thermometer may capture a part of the chain
of being as measured by positive moral emotions; however, for the negative
moral emotions, the moral thermometer may not be as complete of a measure.
Exploring the Divinity Differential
Finally, preliminary analyses examining the divinity differential were
conducted. The divinity differential was examined with two ingroups, Whites and
Christians. For each analysis participants from the ingroup in question were the
only participants selected. Each target groups’ score on the moral thermometer
was subtracted from the ingroup’s score. Then, for each ingroup, the correlations
between the difference score and the measures of humanity and sacredness were
computed. If the difference score was an effective predictor of humanity and/or
sacredness then a negative correlation would be expected.
As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 14, for Christians there was a
relatively consistent negative correlation between sacredness and the difference
score for many of the target groups (M r = -.19). Results were less consistent for
the measure of humanity with only one negative significant correlation (M r = -

50
.05). The bottom panel of Figure 14 represents the results for the White
participants. There was a consistent negative relationship between perceived
sacredness and the difference score (M r = -.33). Again the humanity measure
was less consistent (M r = -.13). Importantly, however, there were three negative
significant correlations and the non-significant correlations trended in the
predicted direction.
Summary of Exploratory Questions
Overall, it appears that the moral thermometer captures some
aspects of both humanness and sacredness. Specifically, the moral thermometer
was related to both the measure of sacredness and humanness for most of the
target entities. As a result, the moral thermometer produced similar results as the
sacred measure when comparing the target entities, and examining the moral
emotions. Furthermore, differences between an ingroup and the target entities on
the moral thermometer were predictive of sacredness, and at times humanness,
suggesting that the moral thermometer may be an appropriate measure of the
divinity differential. Nonetheless, the moral thermometer was an inconsistent
predictor of the negative moral emotions, albeit a more consistent predictor than
the sacredness measure and a more theoretically consistent predictor than the
humanness measure. Overall, these results suggest that the moral thermometer
captures some aspects of the chain of being, in a similar manner as the measure of
sanctification.
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Figure 14
Correlations between the moral thermometer difference scores and the measures
of humanness and sacredness using Christians (top panel) and Whites (bottom
panel) as the ingroup.
Christian Participants

White Participants

Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION (STUDY 1)
People can perceive other humans as less than human, even animal-like
(Goff et al., 2008; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2003). Study 1 represented the
first attempt to examine the possibility of humans perceiving others humans as
more than human, even God-like. If people perceive others as both more and less
than human it would suggest that these two dimensions may be indicative of an
overarching chain of being that organizes people’s social cognitions. Overall, the
hypotheses of the chain of being received mixed support.
Study 1 investigated participant’s perceptions of god, the devil, human
groups, the self, and animals on dimensions of humanness or more than
humanness (sanctification). The results from Study 1 demonstrated that people do
perceive a variety of social targets along a dimension of humanity that appears to
include the perception of some entities as more than human and some entities as
less than human. While the evidence was not incontrovertible, taken as a whole
the data from Study 1 suggested that a study of humanness that does not allow for
the possibility of the perception of others as more than human, may be an
incomplete view of human’s social perception. Specifically, participants viewed
God and the Devil at opposing ends of the sanctification measure. Human groups
and the self were perceived between the God and the Devil, as predicted by the
chain of being. Furthermore, perceptions of sanctification were positively related
to positive moral emotions (an indication of being greater than human, see e.g.,
Haidt & Algoe, 2004) and negatively related to two out of three negative moral
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emotions (an indication of dehumanization, see e.g., Maoz & McCauley, 2008;
Taylor, 2007).
Perceptions of humanness revealed similar results. The devil was
perceived as the least human with animals slightly more human, and the human
groups coming next. God was perceived to be as human as many of the human
groups. At first blush this may be contrary to the hypothesis, but as discussed in
the introduction, past measures of humanness may not effectively capture the
perception of people as more than human (cf. Viki & Calitri, 2008).
Despite the overall encouraging results of Study 1, the data did present
some ambiguity. First, with both the sanctification and humanness measures only
one of the ingroup-outgroup analyses attained statistical significance. Second, for
the sanctification measure, animals were one of the most sanctified entities
examined. Third, the measure of humanness was often positively related to the
negative moral emotions, opposite of the predicted effect. There could be several
explanations for these findings. The ingroup-outgroup results may be due to
social desirability concerns present in a university sample (e.g. Henry, 2008). The
sanctified nature of the animal targets may be due to the particular animals
participants had in mind when completing the measures, as in some
circumstances people attribute humanness to animals (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo,
2007). People have very friendly relations with many of their pets, even bringing
them into restaurants and cafes. Thus, if participants were thinking about their
pets, instead of some sort of wild animal, they may have been more likely to
perceive the animals as more sacred. It should be noted that this only explains the

54
results for the measure of sanctification, but not of humanness. Analyses with the
measure of humanness suggested that animals were perceived as less human than
the human groups and more human than the devil—consistent with the
predictions of the chain of being.
Finally, the measures of humanness may have been positively related to
the negative moral emotions because in order for humans to feel an emotion for a
particular group or person, especially a moral emotion, that social target usually
must have some sort of agency (cf. Gray et al., 2007). Humanity, almost by
definition, contains a sense of agency (Gray et al., 2007; Haslam, 2006). Thus, a
social target must be at least partially human to be the target of moral emotions,
negative or positive. This latter point is interesting, because it throws doubt onto
the measure of humanness or onto the use of emotions to connote humanness.
Likely, there are many different conceptions of humanity (e.g. Bandura, 2002;
Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2003; Maoz &
McCauley, 2008). The negative moral emotions capture part of this, while the
measure of humanness used in the current study captured another part. Given
these findings, the measure of sanctification may best capture the sense of
humanness conveyed by the emotions used in Study 1. More research is
necessary to understand precisely what aspects of humanness are measured by the
variety of measures of humanness. Such work would be beneficial for not only
providing further insight into the results from the present study, but also for the
integration of past work on dehumanization.
Study 1 also provided valuable information about a potential new measure
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of perceived morality. The moral thermometer was predictably related to both
perceptions of sanctification and humanness. The results of this measure, for both
the perceptions of the target groups as well as expressed emotions, were
theoretically consistent (with the exception of the rating of animals). The moral
thermometer also allows for the perception of targets as above and below human
along the same scale, rather than independent humanness and sanctification
scales. Overall, these results suggest that when the moral component of humanity
is of interest, a simple measure like the moral thermometer may be an efficient
and effective choice, however more work is needed to fully validate this measure.
Study 1 provided mixed evidence in support of the specific chain of being
proposed here; however there was strong support for a chain of being. Results
suggested that participants hierarchically arranged the target groups from less
than human (the Devil) to more than human (God), with many of the human
groups falling between these two endpoints. Study 2 aimed to extend research on
the chain of being by testing the hypotheses regarding the chain of being and
religious fundamentalism. By combining research on the chain of being, values,
religion, and cognitive style, Study 2 is able to test a model of fundamentalism
that includes both prejudicial and psychologically beneficial fundamentalism
outcomes.
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CHAPTER V
RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 2)
The purpose of Study 2 was to assess the entire model of religious
fundamentalism and how it relates to the chain of being, promotion, and
protection (Figure 1, p. 12) with path analysis. More specifically, Study 2 tested a
model of religious fundamentalism that included the theoretical models of
promotion and protection developed previously (see Figures 2 & 3, pp. 11 & 13).
A traditional measure of fundamentalism that focuses on the belief in an infallible
authority and closed-mindedness towards religious issues (Altemeyer &
Husberger, 2004) and the need for closure scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994)
were utilized to measure fundamentalism and one of the contributing factors (i.e.
need for closure) to both fundamentalism and the chain of being. The promotion
portion of the model was examined with religious well-being, time spent
volunteering, amount of money donated to religious organizations, and worship
service attendance (see Figure 2).
The protection portion of the model included measures that utilized gay
men and lesbians as the target group because research suggests that this group is
consistently perceived to violate fundamentalist values (Jackson & Esses, 1997;
see also Brandt & Reyna, in press; Fulton, Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999; Laythe,
Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002; Mavor & Gallois, 2008; Rowatt, LaBouff,
Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009; Rowatt, Tsang, Kelly, LaMartina, McCullers, &
McKinley, 2006). Additionally, measures of value violations and threats, the
humanness measure from Study 1, and opposition to public policies that deny
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civil rights to Gays were used to measure the protection portion of the model (see
Figure 3). Importantly, perceptions of African-Americans were also assessed in
order to demonstrate that the effects discussed here are specific to value violating
and threatening groups (e.g. Gays).
Study 2 also tested the divinity differential hypothesis using measures of
value violations/threats as the predictor variable, a computation of the divinity
differential as the mediator variable, and opposition to public policies as the
outcome variable. It is important to note that the divinity differential may be
computed in a variety of ways. For example, it could be possible to subtract an
ougroup’s level of humanness from an ingroup’s level of sanctification; however,
because it is the difference between humanness (or if reverse scored
dehumanization) and sanctification—the two directions on the chain of being—it
is conceptually and computationally suspect. The two measures likely contain
different sorts of responses from participants and thus scores on the two scales
will not necessarily be equivalent. It could also be possible to compute the
divinity differential by taking the outgroup’s level of sanctification or humanness
and subtracting it from the ingroup’s levels of sanctification or humanness,
respectively. These two methods, however, suffer from the same pitfalls as
previous dehumanization research in that the perception of a group as more than
human is lost with the latter method and with the former method the same
problem arises only in reverse. Thus, the moral thermometer used in Study 1 was
used to compute the divinity differential in Study 2.
Statement of Hypotheses
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The primary hypothesis tested in Study 2 was the complete model (Figure
15). The need for closure was expected to contribute to religious fundamentalism.
Fundamentalism, in turn, was predicted to be related to the perception of gays as
violating and threatening values as well as perceptions of the ingroup as
upholding values. Value-related perceptions were, in turn, expected to predict
perceptions of the ingroup and outgroup along the chain of being as represented
by the measures of sanctification and humanness, respectively. Finally, ingroup
sanctification was predicted to relate to individual and group promotion related
behavior, while the dehumanization of the outgroup was predicted to relate to
public policy. This hypothesized model was also tested using the sanctification
measure or the moral thermometer for both the ingroup and the ougroup.
The secondary hypothesis tested the divinity differential. This hypothesis
suggests that the difference between participants’ ingroup and an outgroup on the
moral thermometer will mediate the relationship between the perception of value
violations and opposition to public policy designed to help benefit the outgroup.
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Figure 15
Hypothesized path model (Study 2).
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CHAPTER VI
METHODS (STUDY 2)
The purpose of the second study was to test the chain of being within the
model of religious fundamentalism using an online survey methodology.
Participants completed measures assessing their belief in an infallible authority,
dispositional need for closure, perceived sanctification, humanness, and morality
of the ingroup and outgroup, the protection of the ingroup from the outgroup, and
the promotion of the ingroup. The target groups in this study were
Blacks/African-Americans and gay people. These two groups are some of the
most often examined within research on the religion-prejudice relationship, so it
will be important to test the predictions of the model with these two groups.
Participants
Participants were recruited from a Midwestern university, where they
received partial course credit. Overall 348 participants participated in the survey,
including participants from a variety of religious groups. Because the current
study was interested in the sanctification of participant’s religious ingroups and
the institution where the study was completed is primarily Christian, only the
responses of Christians were analyzed, leaving a total of 223 participants (59 men,
164 women). Participants were primarily White (58.3%), Hispanic (19.3%), or
Black (9.0%). In an effort to maintain a sufficient number of participants, missing
values were replaced with series means for all measures.
Procedures
Participants were directed to a website, where they saw a consent form.
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After consenting to participate in the study, participants were taken to the
survey’s website, where they were asked to fill out a variety of measures
assessing all the portions of the model. After completing the survey the
participants were taken to a debriefing webpage.
Measures
The questionnaire can be found in Appendix B. The items and scales used
in this study are described next. The Cronbach’s Alphas, means, and standard
deviations for the final scales are reported on the diagonals of the correlation
matrix found in Table 2 (p. 61).
All variables were measured on a seven-point scale from 1=strongly
disagree to 7=strongly agree unless otherwise noted. After completing
demographic information, participants completed a measure regarding their belief
in an infallible authority—Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (2004) short form
religious fundamentalism scale. The religious fundamentalism scale contains 12
items such as “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness
and salvation, which must be totally followed” and “Scriptures may contain
general truths, but they should NOT be considered completely, literally true from
beginning to end” (reverse scored). Higher scores indicate greater religious
fundamentalism.
In order to maintain topical consistency within the questionnaire, items
assessing promotion of the religious ingroup were presented next. To assess
promotion of the religious ingroup, five items were used to assess participants’
religious behaviors. The first three items were free response and included: (1)
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“Approximately how much money (in dollars) did you donate to a religious cause
in the last year (congregation, missions, temple, etc.)?” (2) “On average, how
many hours a week do you spend volunteering or working for your religious
group?” and (3) “In the past year, approximately how many hours have you spent
talking to others about your faith?” The fourth item assessed how often
participants attend religious services. It asked “On average, how often do you
attend religious services.” Participants were given several response choices
(1=More than once a week, 2=Once a week, 3=Once a month, 4=Only on special
holy days, 5=Once a year, 6=Less than once a year, 7=Never, practically never).
The fifth item assessed a more personal religious expression: prayer. This item
asked “How often do you pray or commune with God outside of religious
services?” Participants responded on a scale similar to the previous item (1=Every
day, 2=More than once a week, 3=Once a week, 4=At least once a month,
5=Several times a year, 6=Less than several times a year, 7=Never, practically
never). The three open ended items were significantly skewed. The values were
log transformed to create more normally distributed measures. Throughout the
rest of this paper references to these variables represent their logged form. When
combined into a scale they were standardized.
The Religious Well-Being (RWB) sub-scale of the Spiritual Well-Being
scale could be seen as a form of promotion (Ellison, 1983). This 10-item scale
assesses a satisfying relationship with God. Participants were asked about their
experiences with God. Items such as “I believe that God loves me and cares about
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me” and “I don’t have a personally satisfying relationship with God” (reverse
scored) make up the religious well-being sub-scale.
Webster and Kruglanski’s (1994) 42-item need for closure scale was used
to measure dispositional need for cognitive closure. This scale consists of five
subscales including Preference for Order (10-items; “I find that a well ordered life
with regular hours suits my temperament.”), Preference for Predictability (8items; “I don't like going into a situation without knowing what to expect from
it.”), Decisiveness (7-items; “When faced with a problem I usually see the one
best solution very quickly.”), Discomfort with Ambiguity (9-items; “When I am
confused about an important issue, I feel very upset.”), and Closed Mindedness
(8-items; “I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a
group believes.”).
Next, participants completed a measure of sanctification and humanness in
reference to Gays, Blacks/African-Americans, and Christians. These were the
same measures as Study 1. Following these measures, participants completed the
new chain of being measure used in Study 1 for the target groups.
Participants then completed a series of items to assess the perception of
gays, Blacks/African-Americans, and Christians as (a) violating religious values
and beliefs and (b) threatening religious values and beliefs. Items were reversed
scored for Christians to represent the perception of Christians as upholding
values. Four items measured religious value violations and included “Typically,
gays do not uphold the values of my religion,” “Typically, gays disagree with the
teachings of my religion,” “Typically, gays do not uphold the traditions of my
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religion” and “There are very few differences between the values of gays and
members of my religion” where “gays” was subsequently replaced with
“Blacks/African-Americans” and “Christians.” Two items measured threats to
religious values and beliefs and included “Typically, gays threaten the vision of
my religion” and “Gays threaten the expression of my religion” where “gays” was
subsequently replaced with “Blacks/African-Americans” and “Christians.”
Finally, participants completed items assessing protection in the form of
discrimination via political policy preferences. All items were assessed on a scale
ranging from 1=strongly oppose to 7=strongly support. Two items were used for
both gays and Blacks/African-Americans. These items were “Do you strongly
support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure to substantially increase federal
spending in support of the civil rights of gays” and “Do you strongly support or
strongly oppose: A ballot measure to substantially decrease federal spending in
support of the civil rights of gays” where “gays” was subsequently replaced with
“Blacks/African-Americans.” Four additional items were also used to tap into a
broader range of policy preferences towards gays. The items included “Do you
strongly support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure that would legalize gay
marriage and would allow same-sex married couples all the same benefits of
heterosexual married couples, including tax and insurance benefits;” “Do you
strongly support or strongly oppose: A constitutional amendment that will define
marriage as something that can exist only between a man and a woman;” Do you
strongly support or strongly oppose: Laws designed to protect gay people from
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discrimination in the work place;” and “Do you strongly support or strongly
oppose: Laws designed to restrict gay people from adopting children.”
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CHAPTER VII
RESULTS (STUDY 2)
The primary hypothesis tested in Study 2 included the entire proposed
model, tested using structural equation modeling (see Figure 15, p. 53). The
hypothesized model was tested using the structural model presented in Figure 16.
After testing the model, mediation analyses were used to test the hypotheses
regarding the divinity differential.
Preliminary Analyses
Only the need for order, preference for predictability, and closedmindedness need for closure subscales were used because of their importance in
past research on fundamentalism (Brandt & Reyna, in press). Specifically,
decisiveness and the aversion of ambiguity, as measured by the need for closure
scale, do not seem to play a role in fundamentalism. This is also the case with the
current sample (all r’s < .08, p = ns). Need for order and preference for
predictability were used to create a latent variable for the current study. Closedmindedness did not load highly onto the latent variable (<.40) and was thus
treated as an independent indicator. Additionally, value threat and value violations
were used to create a single latent variable. For the ingroup these variables were
reverse coded so that higher numbers indicate that the ingroup is less threatening
and upholds values.
Preliminary analyses suggested that prayer loaded more effectively on the
religious well-being variable, creating what will be called private promotion. The
remaining promotion dependent variable will be called public promotion as it
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contains more publicly visible behaviors (e.g. attending worship services,
volunteering). These items were standardized and averaged together. A
correlation matrix including means, standard deviations, and scale reliabilities
(Cronbach’s Alphas) can be found in Table 2.
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Figure 16
Specification of the hypothesized path model.

Note: CoB = the measure of the chain of being used in the model. Three versions of the hypothesized model were
estimated using different measures of the chain of being for Christians and Gays (see Table 3). Double-headed arrows
connecting endogenous variables represent the correlations between errors for the endogenous variables.
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Table 2
Correlations, means, standard deviations, and scale reliabilities for all indicators included in path analyses.

1. Order
2. Predictability
3. ClosedMindedness
4. Religious
Fund.
5. Private Prom.
6. Public Prom.
7. Chr. Uphold
8. Chr. Do Not
Threaten
9. Chr. Sanct.
10. Chr. Moral
Therm.
11. Gays Value
Violation
12. Gay Threat
13. Gay
Humanness
14. Gay Sanct.
15. Gay Moral
Therm.
16. Gay Policy
M
SD

1

2

(.80)
.59**

3

4

5

6

7

(.77)

.03

.21**

(.61)

.18**

.20**

.15*

(.90)

.25**
.15*
-.19**

.10
.02
-.13*

-.07
-.03
.07

-.19**

-.07

.19**

8

9

10

11

12

13

.59**
.46**
-.09

(.94)
.50**
-.22**

(.73)
-.24**

(.85)

.07

-.05

-.24**

-.28**

.58**

(.69)

-.01

-.10

.31**

.26**

.24**

-.30**

-.27**

(.95)

.22**

.11

-.01

.37**

.29**

.32**

-.31**

-.31**

.48**

--

.16*

.16*

-.01

.17**

.10

.03

.01

.06

.02

.002

(.84)

.12

.19**

.13*

.35**

.15*

.05

.15*

.26**

.10

.05

.48**

(.64)

-.04

-.06

-.03

-.04

-.09

-.11

-.001

-.01

.36**

.05

-.19**

-.15*

(.60)

-.10

-.12

-.12

-.20**

-.06

-.09

-.04

-.08

.44**

.15

-.33**

-.39**

.55**

(.92)

-.05

-.05

-.04

-.08

.01

.06

-.18**

-.20**

.24**

.51**

-.32**

-.41**

.21**

.52**

--

-.13

-.08

-.03

-.30**

-.08

-.19**

-.02

.03

-.01

.23**

-.19**

-.39**

.05

-.46**

-.26**

4.47
.96

4.11
.93

3.42
.74

3.55
1.26

5.10
1.41

.00
.74

5.90
1.21

6.09
1.20

4.73
1.59

75.26
20.58

3.91
1.66

2.52
1.57

3.82
1.04

3.78
1.67

66.13
22.77

Note: Numbers on diagonal and in bold-face type indicate Cronbach’s α, with the exception of the two threat measures
and. The reliability of these two-item measures are quantified using Pearson correlations. The two moral thermometer
items are single item measures and thus have no internal reliability to report. *p<.05, **p<.01.
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Importantly, religious fundamentalism was not related to the perception of
Blacks as violating (r(221)=-.03, p = .64) or threatening religious values
(r(221)=-.09, p = .20). Fundamentalism was also related to the perception of
Blacks as more human (r(221)=.16, p = .02). Contrary to predictions,
fundamentalism was related to more opposition to public policy designed to help
Blacks (r(221)=.15, p = .05). Despite this finding, these results are consistent with
the hypothesis that Blacks did not constitute a value violating group for religious
fundamentalists and thus, would not be dehumanized.
This pattern of results remains the same if Black participants are not
included in the sample. For non-Black Christians, religious fundamentalism was
still unrelated to perceptions of Blacks as violating (r(200)=-.003, p = .97) or
threatening (r(200)=.07, p = .32) religious values. Contrary to the previous results
with all participants included, but consistent with the hypotheses, the relationship
between fundamentalism and opposition to public policy designed to help Blacks
was not significant (r(200)=.04, p = .56). Additionally, fundamentalists still
perceived Blacks as more human (r(200)=.14, p = .05). Given these results and in
order to present a more simplified model, the variables referring to Blacks were
not included in the final analyses.
Structural Equation Modeling
A series of structural models were fit to the data using measures of
sanctification, humanness, and the moral thermometer. Table 3 contains the final
fit statistics for the three hypothesized and final models. Hypothesized models
indicate models specified according to Figure 16. The first model used the

71
measure of sanctification for Christians, but the measure of humanness for Gays.
The second model used the measure of sanctification for both Christians and
Gays. The third model used the moral thermometer for both Christians and Gays.
As can be seen in Table 3, the hypothesized model did not adequately fit the data
for any of the three basic models. In order to ascertain a more accurate impression
of the data all direct effects that were not included in the hypothesized model (e.g.
paths between closed-mindedness and public promotion, closed-mindedness and
public policy, Christians uphold and public promotion etc.) were added to each of
the three models. The final model represents a model where all nonsignificant
direct paths (with the exception of originally hypothesized direct effects) are
removed, leaving only significant direct paths.
The fit for each of the final models can be found in Table 3. All final
models had adequate fit. While the Chi-square tests were significant they were
greatly reduced compared to the hypothesized model. Moreover, alternative
measures of fit produced either good (CFI, RMSEA) or adequate fit (AGFI),
suggesting each of the final models adequately fit the data. The final models are
presented in Figures 17, 18, and 19. Bold paths in the figures represent paths
predicted by the hypothesized model. The factor loadings for the latent variables
and the correlations between variables for these final models can be found in
Table 4.
Consistent with the hypothesized model, need for closure, as represented
by closed-mindedness and the desire for predictability and order, predicted
religious fundamentalism (all Models). The need for closure variables also
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predicted three variables not originally specified in the hypothesized models (all
Models). Predictability and order and closed-mindedness predicted perceptions of
Christians as upholding values. Closed-mindedness also negatively predicted
private promotion and the perceptions of Christians as sacred (Models 1 and 2)
and moral (Model 3), such that participants who were less closed-minded were
more likely to privately promote their religious beliefs and perceive their
religious ingroup (Christians) as more sacred and moral.
The protection portion of the model also found support, especially in
Models 1 and 2. In all three models religious fundamentalism predicted the
perception of gays as violating and threatening religious values. In turn,
perceptions of gays as violating and threatening religious values were related to
the perception of gays as less human (Model1), sanctified (Model 2), or moral
(Model 3). In turn, perceptions of gays as less human (Model 1) or less sacred
(Model 2) predicted opposition to civil rights policy for gays. However, when the
chain of being was measured with the moral thermometer, this relationship was
not significantly different from zero. In addition to the predicted paths, there were
several added paths in the final model. Religious fundamentalism directly
predicted perception of gays along the moral thermometer (Model 3) and
opposition to civil rights for gays (all Models). Finally, perceptions that gays
violate and threaten religious values directly predicted opposition to civil rights
(all Models).

73
Table 3
Overall model fit for hypothesized and final estimated models.
χ2 (df)

CFI

AGFI

RMSEA

Hyp. Model

308.88 (57)***

.66

.76

.141 (.126, .157)

Final Model

69.53 (47)*

.97

.91

.046 (.020, .068)

Hyp. Model

290.07 (57)***

.72

.76

.136 (.120, .151)

Final Model

74.85 (48)**

.97

.91

.050 (.026, .071)

Hyp. Model

298.77 (57)

.71

.76

.138 (.123, .154)

Final Model

66.43 (47)*

.98

.91

.043 (.013, .066)

Model Name
Model 1: Sanct-Hum

Model 2: Just Sanct.

Model 3: Moral Therm.

Note: The names of the models indicate what measures of the chain of being were
used. In Model 1 the sanctification measure was used for Christians and the
Humanness measure was used for Gays. In Model 2 the sanctification measure
was used for both Christians and Gays. In Model 3 the moral thermometer
measure was used for both Christians and Gays. Hyp. Model = model specified
according to Figure 16. Final Model = models summarized in Figures 17 –
19.*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

74
Table 4
Factor loadings, path coefficients, and correlations for the three final estimated
models.
Final
Model 1

Final
Model 2

Final
Model 3

Factor Loadings
Gays Threat
Gays Violate Values
Chr. Not Threat
Chr. Uphold Values
Order
Predictability

<--<--<--<--<--<---

Gays Violate
Gays Violate
Chr. Uphold
Chr. Uphold
Pred. & Order
Pred. & Order

1.02a
.47***
.82a
.71***
.88a
.70***

.90a
.53***
.81a
.72***
.94a
.65***

.86a
.54***
.83a
.69***
.95a
.65***

<--->
<--->
<--->
<--->
<--->
<--->
<--->
<--->

Closed-Mindedness
Chr. Uphold Er.
Chr. Sanct. Er.
Chr. Sanct. Er.
Chr. Moral Therm. Er.
Pub. Prom. Er.
Gay Policy Er.
Gay Policy Er.

.08
-.35***
.45***
---.22***
.13*
-.17*

.05
-.36***
--.65***
-.23**
.15*
-.15*

.05
-.40***
--.65***
.23***
.16*
-.16*

Correlations
Pred. & Order
Gays Violate Er.
Gays Hum. Er.
Gays Sanct. Er.
Gays Moral Therm. Er.
Priv. Prom Er.
Pub. Prom. Er.
Priv. Prom Er.

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, aindicates reference indicator and thus no
significant tests were performed on this path. Er. = error.
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Figure 17
Final structural model for Model 1

Note: Dashed lines indicate nonsignificant paths at p>.05. Bolded lines indicate paths contained in the original model. Correlations
between factors and factor loadings for latent variables can be found in Table 4.
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Figure 18
Final structural model for Model 2

Note: Dashed lines indicate nonsignificant paths at p>.05. Bolded lines indicate paths contained in the original model. Correlations
between factors and factor loadings for latent variables can be found in Table 4.
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Figure 19
Final structural model for Model 3

Note: Dashed lines indicate nonsignificant paths at p>.05. Bolded lines indicate paths contained in the original model. Correlations
between factors and factor loadings for latent variables can be found in Table 4.
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The promotion portion of the model received less support. Fundamentalism did
not predict the perception of Christians as upholding values, likely because the
Christian sample of participants all believed that Christians upheld religious
values—a ceiling effect. The perception of Christians as upholding values,
however, did predict perceptions of Christians as more sacred (Models 1 and 2)
and moral (Model 3). Contrary to the model, perceptions of Christians as sacred
(Models 1 and 2) or moral (Model 3) did not predict public or private promotion
in the final model. There were several additional paths for the promotion portion
of the model. While religious fundamentalism did not predict perceptions of
Christians as upholding religious values, it did predict perceptions of Christians
as more sacred (Models 1 and 2) and moral (Model 3). Religious fundamentalism
and perceptions of Christians as upholding religious values also significantly
predicted both public and private promotion (all Models).
Many of the paths that did not support the full model failed to because the
direct effects of other variables overwhelmed the impact of the predicted path.
For example, when examining the raw correlations, perceptions of Christians as
sacred and moral predicted public and private promotion (see Table 2); however,
this effect was completely accounted for with the direct paths of Christians
upholding values and religious fundamentalism (see Figures 17 – 19). Similarly,
when just observing the raw correlations, the perception of Gays as less moral
predicted opposition to public policy (see Table 2); however, when all of the other
variables were entered into the model (Model 3), perceptions that gays violate
and threaten religious values and religious fundamentalism accounted for
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opposition to public policy. Overall, an analysis of the additional paths that were
added to the model suggests that religious fundamentalism, perceptions of value
violators and upholders, and even the need for closure variables are more
proximal predictors than originally theorized.
Divinity Differential
The divinity differential hypothesis suggests that while perceptions of
value violations and threats will predict opposition to public policy, this direct
effect will be mediated by the difference between the ingroup (Christians) and the
outgroup (Gays) on the chain of being. First, the items making up the value
violation and value threat scales for gays were aggregated to create one five-item
measure. This measure was reliable (α = .82). The divinity differential was
computed by subtracting the outgroups score on the moral thermometer from the
ingroups score on the same measure. The mediation was tested using Preacher
and Hayes (2008) SPSS mediation macro that utilizes 5,000 bootstrapped
resamples to create 95% bias and corrected confidence interval. This method of
testing mediations is more accurate (Shrout & Bolger, 2002) than the traditional
Baron and Kenny (1986) approach.
The results of the mediation analysis and test of the divinity differential
can be found in Figure 17. Consistent with predictions, value violations and
threats significantly predicted the divinity differential, which in turn predicted
opposition to public policy. This indirect effect of value violations through the
divinity differential was significant (Mediated Effect = .17, SE = .04, 95% CI =
.10, .27), suggesting that the differential perceptions of ingroups and outgroups
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along the chain of being is at least partially driven by value violations and
predictive of protection.

Figure 20
The divinity differential mediates the relationship between value violations and
opposition to public policy.

B = 6.94***, SE = .91
Value violations
and threats

Divinity
Differential
B = .41***, SE = .06
B = .23***, SE = .06

B = .03***, SE = .004
Opposition to
Public Policy

Note: Coefficients represent unstandardized beta weights. ***p<.001
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CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION (STUDY 2)
Study 2 used the chain of being from Study 1 in an attempt to combine
prejudicial and psychologically beneficial outcomes of religious fundamentalists.
In this way, Study 2 expanded on the findings from Study 1 by examining the
antecedents and consequences of perceiving ingroups and outgroup along the
chain of being. Past research has examined both of these fundamentalism
outcomes (e.g. Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Pargamen, 2002), but has not
attempted to combine them into a single theoretical account. The current study
provided a step in the direction of integration. The model suggested that because
of religious fundamentalist’s belief in an infallible authority combined with the
concurrent closed cognitive style lead fundamentalists to view the ingroup as
closer to God (sacred) and outgroups as closer to animals (dehumanized) on the
chain of being. These perceptions were predicted to be driven by beliefs that the
ingroup and outgroups uphold and violate values, respectively. Perceptions of
ingroups as sacred were expected to predict group promoting behavior, while
perceptions of outgroups as less than human were expected to predict attitudes
and behaviors that could serve to protect the ingroup.
Results from Study 2 provided some support for the full model of
fundamentalism. Consistent with past research (e.g. Brandt & Reyna, in press)
and the current model, the need for closure (as captures by preferences for
prediction and order, and closed-mindedness) predicted religious fundamentalism,
suggesting that religious fundamentalism provides people with a orderly and

82
predictable lens through which to view the world.
Protection
Providing support for the protection portion of the model, religious
fundamentalism was related to the perception of gays as violating and threatening
religious values. In turn, these value violations and threats lead to the perception
of gays as less human. Fundamentalists protected their ingroup against Gays by
opposing public policies designed to help Gays. These results were confirmed in
all models tested, with the exception of the model utilizing the moral
thermometer (Model 3), where the direct effect of value violations/threats
overwhelmed the impact of the moral thermometer. There were also several
additional direct paths, suggesting that the model explains only a piece of the
relationships described here. Overall, these results suggest that religious
fundamentalists perceive Gays as violating and threatening important religious
values and are thus dehumanized and denied civil rights. Prejudice by
fundamentalists is driven and rationalized with values and the denial of humanity.
Promotion
The promotion portion of the model received less support. Contrary to
predictions, fundamentalists did not perceive Christians as upholding religious
values any more than their non-fundamentalist Christian counterparts. This
nonsignificant relationship was likely due to a ceiling effect, whereby the allChristian sample primarily perceived Christians as upholding their religious
values. The means for the two Christians upholding values variables were near
the top of the possible range of values (5.90 and 6.09 on a 7-point scale).
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Consistent with predictions, this ceiling effect did not mask the impact of the
perception of Christians as upholding values on the perceptions of Christians as
sacred and moral; in all models the perception of Christians as upholding values
predicted the perception of Christians as higher on the chain of being.
Unfortunately for the model, perceptions of Christians along the chain of being
(as both sacred and moral) did not predict private or public promoting behaviors.
Overall, these result suggest that upholding values is an important determinant of
one’s placement along the chain of being; however, fundamentalism may not play
a role in determining Christians’ perceptions of upholding values, and the chain
of being may not play a role in promoting the ingroup.
The additional paths, especially in the promotion portion of the model,
suggest some support for the ideas of the chain of being. While fundamentalism
was not related to the perception of Christians as upholding values, there was a
significant direct path from fundamentalism to measures of the chain of being
(sacred and moral), suggesting that fundamentalists do perceive their ingroup as
more sacred and more moral than non-fundamentalists, but that this relationship
may not be driven by perceptions of values. While there may be an unmeasured
intervening variable, it may also be the case that the cognitive styles (e.g. closedminded, preference for order) and specific beliefs (e.g. infallible authority)
associated with fundamentalism directly influence perceptions of the ingroup as
particularly sacred and moral. For example, perceiving one’s own group as higher
on the chain of being may be driven by the preference for an orderly and
unambiguous view of the world, which may lead people to perceive their own
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group has higher on the chain of being in an effort to view their own group as
distinct and independent of other groups (cf. Brewer, 1991).
Public and private promotion were not predicted by the measures of
Christian’s sacredness or morality; however, several other constructs significantly
predicted both public and private promoting behavior. First, and consistent with
past research (Genia, 1996; Sethi & Seligman, 1993), religious fundamentalism
was directly related to both public and private promotion suggesting that the
current sample and measures are consonant with past work in this area.
Additionally, perceptions of Christians as upholding values predicted both
kinds of promoting behavior. This latter result suggests that perceiving an
ingroup as upholding important values influences behaviors that can serve to
benefit the ingroup and the self. This argument is implicit in the research on
symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, 2005) and value violations more generally
(Henry & Reyna, 2007). This work suggests that people derogate groups who
violate important cultural values (such as hard work and economic
individualism)—consistent with the protection portion of the current model.
Embedded in this literature, however, is the assumption that people in the ingroup
(often White-Americans) believe that the ingroup upholds these values and thus
promotes policies and ideologies to the benefit of the ingroup. While not designed
to explicitly test this idea, the current study provides support for the notion that
perception of the ingroup as upholding values is important in determining
attitudes and behaviors in the same way perceptions of the outgroup as violating
values is important in determining opposition to public policy.
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Finally, closed-mindedness was negatively related to private promoting
behavior. At first glance this result may seem surprising given that closedmindedness is often positively related to religious attitudes and behavior (e.g.
Altemeyer, 2002; Brandt & Reyna, in press). Nonetheless, when all of the
variables were entered into the model the more open-minded the participants the
more likely they were to endorse attitudes and behaviors that privately promote
the ingroup, such as religious well-being and prayer. This result is interesting for
at least two reasons. First, it suggests that there are personal benefits, including
religious benefits, to being open-minded. While much of the work on closedmindedness has emphasized its detrimental (or in the case of open-mindedness,
beneficial) consequences in intergroup and interpersonal contexts (e.g. Cohen,
Sherman, Bastardi, Hsu, McGoey, & Ross, 2007; Kruglanski, 2004), the attitudes
and behaviors encapsulated in the private promotion variable represent largely
intrapersonal attitudes. This suggests that closed-mindedness (open-mindedness)
can negatively (positively) influence a person’s psychological well-being. More
research is necessary to understand the role of closed- and open-mindedness on
psychological health.
Divinity Differential
Study 2 also provided support for the idea of a divinity differential.
Importantly, the perception that an outgroup (Gays) violated and threatened the
values of the ingroup (Christians) increased the difference between Gays and
Christians on the moral thermometer. The difference, the divinity differential,
mediated the relationship between the value violations and public policy
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positions. These results provide a mechanism for past work examining value
violations (e.g. Henry & Reyna, 2007). This past research has suggested that
perceptions of groups as intentionally violating values causes people to perceive
these value violating groups as less deserving of public aid (Henry & Reyna,
2007; Reyna et al., 2006, 2009). The current research suggests that in addition to
deservingness, the relationship between the ingroup and outgroup on a chain of
being—as measured by the moral thermometer—in part drive the value violationpublic policy relationship.
The results from the divinity differential also suggests that the relative
difference between the ingroup and the outgroup along the chain of being may be
an important determinant of reactions to the outgroup. Most research on
dehumanization has conceptualized “human” as the top of the hierarchy where
groups perceived as less than human were likely to face discrimination (Haslam,
2006; Leyens et al., 2001). The current study revealed that the perception as less
than human may not be the most important perception to consider. Instead, the
perception of a group in reference to the ingroup on a scale than can include
perceptions of groups as more than human may be more important. For example,
Christians and Gays were both perceived as above the midpoint on the moral
thermometer, suggesting that they were both perceived as human to some degree.
Regardless of the absolute value of the perception of Gays along the moral
thermometer, the difference between the two groups (Christians and Gays) was a
significant predictor of opposition to public policy. This suggests that Gays might
not be dehumanized per se, but rather because they are lower on the chain of
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being than Christians they face discrimination. Research and theorizing on the
perception of humanity needs to consider the perception of people as more than
human and the impact this might have on intergroup perceptions of humanity.
Overall, Study 2 provided support for the psychological underpinnings of
religious fundamentalism, the protection portion of the model, and the divinity
differential. Partial support was found for the promotion portion of the model.
These results suggest that outgroups who violate and threaten the religious values
of fundamentalists are dehumanized and face derogation in an effort, by
fundamentalists, to protect their ingroup and its beliefs. While perceptions of the
ingroup as closer to God do not cause group promoting behavior, religious
fundamentalists do perceive their ingroup as more sacred and moral and are more
likely to promote the ingroup than non-fundamentalists. Additionally, the
difference between the ingroup and the outgroup on the moral thermometer was
an important determinant of opposition to public policy designed to help the
outgroup. Rather than the absolute value of a group as moral or unmoral, the
difference between the ingroup and the outgroup proved to be a significant
predictor. Furthermore, the current study revealed the value of open-mindedness
to psychological health.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
Religious fundamentalism and dehumanization have both contributed to
prejudice, discrimination, intergroup violence and—in some cases—terrorism
(Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006; Hitchens, 2007; Hunsberger & Jackson,
2005; Opotow, 1990; Wellman, 2007; see also Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009).
However, fundamentalism has also been linked to better than average physical
and psychological well-being (George, Ellison, & Larson, 2002; Pargament,
2002), suggesting that there may be some benefit to holding extreme,
fundamentalist ideologies. The current study investigated these dual outcomes by
expanding the dimension of humanity to include the perception of people,
animals, and supernatural entities as both greater than, or less than human—a
dimension called the chain of being.
Recent theoretical advances have suggested that the perception of humans
and animals fall along a similar scale, where anthropomorphism describes the
perception of animals as more human and dehumanization describes the
perception of people as more animal-like (Epely, Waytz, & Caccioppo, 2007;
Haslam, 2006). Others have examined the perception of supernatural beings
more generally, and God specifically, in terms of humanness and the
characteristics of humans (Demoulin, Saroglous, & Van Pachterbeke, 2008; Gray
et al., 2007). The current research, especially Study 1, extends this work by
examining the perception of supernatural agents, humans, and animals along the
same dimension.
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Overall, the current studies suggested that research on humanity that does
not take into account the perception of humans as more than human may not
capture the full extent of social perception. For example, in Study 1 the measure
of sanctification suggested that God was perceived as significantly more human
than any of the human target groups. However, when using a more traditional
measure of humanness God was considered as human as several of the human
groups—a result that is contradictory with both intuition and the empirical work
on the perception of God (Meier et al., 2007). By using a measure of
sanctification it was possible to examine a broader range of humanity, including
the perception of people (and gods) as more than human. The current study was
the first study to attempt to go beyond “human” in the study and measurement of
humanness.
Expanding on the idea that people may be perceived as more than human,
the current research suggests that the perception of a group as less than human
(dehumanization) may not be the primary concern for people studying intergroup
relations. Rather, it is the difference between an ingroup and an outgroup along
the chain of being—the divinity differential—that results in discrimination and
the protection of ingroup values and norms. This suggests that a group does not
need to be seen as less than human to face discrimination. Instead, it is the
difference between the ingroup and the outgroup that is most consequential. For
example, consider the situation where an ingroup and an outgroup are both
perceived to be more than human, but the outgroup is still perceived as lower on
the chain of being compared to the ingroup. In this situation the current model
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would suggest that the outgroup would still face discrimination. However, past
work on dehumanization that considers humanity as the top of the moral
hierarchy would not necessarily make this prediction because the outgroup was
not actually dehumanized. In support of this idea, the test of the divinity
differential in Study 2 suggested that Gays were perceived on the top half of the
moral thermometer, yet the difference between Gays and Christians on the
measure predicted opposition to public policy that would help benefit Gays and
Gay rights.
The current study also examined several antecedents to the perception of
humans as above and below human. Specifically, it was proposed that the need
for closure and religious fundamentalism would influence perceptions of
Christians and Gays along the chain of being. This research adds to the nascent
literature examining how ideological beliefs (e.g. conservatism) can influence the
perception of a group as human (Hodson & Costello, 2007). Religious
fundamentalism directly, and the need for closure indirectly, were related to the
perception of the ingroup (Christians) as more sacred and moral. Similarly, both
fundamentalism directly and the need for closure indirectly related to the
perception of the outgroup (Gays) as less sacred, human, and moral. Importantly,
the perception of Gays as less sacred and human was partially mediated by
perceptions of Gays as violating and threatening religious values. This is
important for several reasons. First, the results on the antecedents of perceptions
along the chain of being provide evidence that it is not necessarily purely the
ingroup-outgroup distinction that drives dehumanization (cf. Leyens et al., 2001).
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While other researchers have made a similar point (Haslam, 2006; Viki &
Abrams, 2003), the current research extends this idea by including the need for
closure and religious fundamentalism as potential causes for the perception of
humans as more or less than human. Second, these results suggest that the
ingroup-outgroup distinction may be, in part, a function of the perceived value
similarity (or dissimilarity) of the outgroup, such that value violations may be
used to legitimize dehumanization and public policy positions (cf. Henry &
Reyna, 2007).
Importantly, the current study did not end with the perception of humans
as more or less than human. Rather, the model tested the idea that participants
would attempt to promote a sanctified ingroup and protect against a dehumanized
outgroup. While there was little support for the former predictions, the protection
portion of the model did attain support. That is, participants perceived value
violating outgroups as less human, sacred, and moral. In turn, participants
opposed public policies aimed at benefiting the outgroup. These results are
consistent with recent research that suggests groups may use prejudice and
discrimination as a tool to protect the validity and vitality of their opinions and
beliefs (Brandt & Reyna, in press). While the promotion portion of the model
received little direct support, the current study replicated some past work (Genia,
1996; Sethi & Seligman, 1993) suggesting that fundamentalists are more likely to
promote their ingroup. Thus, it was not that fundamentalists in the current sample
did not endorse promoting attitudes and behaviors, but rather these attitudes were
not directly driven by the perception of the ingroup as sacred and moral.
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Future Research
The two studies presented here opened doors for future research on both
the chain of being and fundamentalism.
Study 1
One of the potential short falls of Study 1 was the number of groups
participants were asked to rate. This could have aroused social desirability
concerns. For example, Blacks, a group that continues to face dehumanization
(Goff et al., 2008), were perceived as the most human of the human groups. More
focused comparisons (two or three groups, rather than eight) and a betweensubjects design may help reduce social desirability concerns among participants.
The unexpected level of sanctification attributed to animals also deserves
further study. People can anthropomorphize animals, especially pets, viewing
them as if they were human (Epely et al., 2007). If participants were thinking
about their pets then anthropomorphization may contribute to sanctification
levels. A second explanation may involve the amount of moral agency granted to
animals. If animals are not attributed moral agency and are already perceived in a
positive light they may be attributed greater levels of sanctification. That is,
animals may not have the moral agency to fall from grace. Future research that
attempts to investigate these explanations may benefit by including people’s pets,
but also animals that live in the wild. Varying levels of threat an animal presents
(a potentially dangerous wild animal vs. a relatively benign wild animal) may
also contribute to perceptions of humanness and sacredness of animals.
Emotions have been used as proxy indicators of both humanness and
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saintliness (Haidt & Algoe, 2004; Maoz & McCauley, 2008). The results of the
current study suggest that this requires further exploration. The current measure
of sanctification and the moral thermometer suggest that the use of the moral
emotions as a proxy for humanness and saintliness may be justified; however, the
measure of humanness provided mixed results. The counterintuitive results
regarding the humanness measure and the negative moral emotions may provide a
fruitful avenue for future research. It may be possible that the measure of
humanness or the emotion measures are not accurate measures of humanity.
Much of the recent work validating measures of humanness (Haslam et al., 2005)
have done so by asking participants explicitly if they thought certain traits were
unique to humans or a part of human nature. There is face validity to this
approach, however, people may not be able to accurately make these kinds of
judgments.
The use of moral emotions to measure dehumanization has been based
more on theoretical arguments, rather than empirical results. For example, disgust
has been used as a measure of dehumanization because it represents the reaction
to people who remind us of our animal-nature (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000).
However, it is unclear whether people who are treated with disgust are actually
perceived as less human. Recent neuroscientific research (Harris & Fiske, 2006,
2007) has provided some evidence for the use of moral emotions (specifically,
disgust) for measuring dehumanization. When participants saw targets who are
stereotyped as cold and incompetent (e.g. the homeless, drug addicts) there was
significantly less activation in the medial prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain
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implicated in perceiving social targets (Amodio & Frith, 2006). Additionally,
when viewing these targets there was increased activation in the amygdala and
insula regions of the brain, which have been implicated in feelings of disgust
(Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003). This recent evidence does suggest
that moral emotions may be a more appropriate measure of dehumanization than
the measures of humanness used in the current studies.
Study 2
The results from Study 2 also suggest potential avenues for future
research. The search for mechanisms for the fundamentalism-sanctification and
fundamentalism-promotion relationships could provide insight into the structure
and function of fundamentalism. For example, fundamentalism may predict
sanctification because of the core components of fundamentalism—belief in an
infallible authority and closed-mindedness about religious issues. By believing
and attempting to follow an infallible authority fundamentalists may perceive
themselves as closer to the authority (i.e. closer to God) than people who are not
attempting to follow the authority to the same extent. Similarly, promotion could
be the result of attempting to follow an infallible authority that demands regular
worship and prayer. Research that attempts to independently measure the
psychological components of fundamentalism may be able to shed light onto the
precise mechanisms that make fundamentalism a potent predictor of
sanctification and group promoting attitudes and behaviors.
Perhaps most interestingly the negative relationship between the closedmindedness and private promotion suggests a potential fruitful line of inquiry.
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While research has documented many inter- and intra-group effects of closedmindedness (for a review see Kruglanski, 2004), the current research suggested
that there may be intrapersonal effects as well. Importantly, there appears to be
some benefit to remaining open-minded about issues, especially when predicting
the private promotion variable in the current study. More research is needed in
order to determine if this type of effect expands beyond the outcome variables in
the current study. Overall, the negative relationship between closed-mindedness
and private promotion is conceptually consistent with theory that suggests that
authoritarianism represents the lack of efficient strategies for coping with
uncertainty and anxiety (Oesterreich, 2005). That is, people who are not
authoritarian would be expected to have better psychological health because they
have developed better coping mechanisms.
Research that has examined the impact of value violations on support or
opposition to public policy has suggested that value violations provide
information about the deservingness of the policies’ primary beneficiaries (Henry
& Reyna, 2007; Reyna et al., 2006). The current study suggested that differences
between the ingroup and the outgroup along the chain of being (as represented by
the moral thermometer) at least partially mediates the relationship between value
violations and opposition to public policy. These two mechanisms are not
necessarily independent or competing, but rather may work in tandem to drive the
value violation-public policy relationship. Additional research may attempt to
integrate these two mechanisms. Perceptions of deservingness may play an
intervening role between value violations and the divinity differential, suggesting
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a multiple mediation hypothesis, whereby groups who are not perceived as
deserving (due to value violations) “fall from grace” and are perceived lower on
the chain of being (cf. Reyna et al., 2010).
The relationships and implied causality examined in Study 2 cannot be
confirmed based on the results. For example, the model suggests that the need for
closure underlies fundamentalism and that these two constructs drive perceptions
of groups as upholding or violating values, perceptions of groups along the chain
of being, opposition to public policy, and group promoting behavior. It is
important for future work to manipulate the predictor variables used in this study
in order to determine if there are causal relationships between the variables, or if
the variables in the current study are merely co-occurring phenomena. There is,
however, past research that does suggest the implied causal direction of the
current work. For example, manipulations of the need for closure and existential
threat have increased support for ideologies based upon traditional and other firm
beliefs (e.g. conservatism, Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon,
1999). Additionally, it is likely that an ideological belief system, such as
fundamentalism, informs our perceptions of values, support for public policy, and
support for group serving behaviors because of the strong set of beliefs the
ideology represents. However, there may be reciprocal causal arrangements. For
example, while fundamentalism may initially cause someone to attend church and
donate money to their religious organization, these actions may, in turn, cause
someone to become more fundamentalist. The teachings at worship services may
bolster the initial beliefs and the beliefs may also be a method of rationalizing
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monetary donations. Research that attempts to carefully test the causal
relationships between religious beliefs—perhaps by priming religious concepts
(e.g. Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007)—and related outcome variables would help
move this area of research forward.
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CHAPTER X
SUMMARY
Religious fundamentalism has been related to a variety of prejudicial and
discriminatory attitudes and public policy preferences. However, contrary to
accounts of fundamentalism as pathological, fundamentalists are physically and
mentally healthier than non-fundamentalists (Genia, 1996; Pargament, 2002;
Sethi & Seligman, 1993). The purpose of the current paper was to examine both
of these fundamentalist outcomes within the same model.
In order to capture both positive and negative outcomes of
fundamentalism the current paper proposed that people perceived others as
greater than or less than human along a dimension of social cognition called the
chain of being (cf. Haidt & Algoe, 2004; Lovejoy, 1964/1936). It was proposed
that religious fundamentalism and the need for would lead participants to
perceive one’s ingroup as upholding important values. These perceptions would
lead the ingroup to be seen as more than human and would lead to more group
promoting behaviors as well as greater psychological well-being; however,
perceived differences in values would cause some groups to be perceived as
lower on this chain of being. Groups that are perceived as lower, less than human,
on the chain of being would also face discrimination as a way to protect the
ingroup from value violating and threatening outgroups.
In order to test these ideas two studies were conducted. In the first study
participants rated a variety of target groups on measures of humanness (Haslam et
al., 2005), sanctification (Mahoney et al., 2003), and moral emotions (e.g.
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disgust, admiration). Results indicated that participants appeared to rate target
entities along a chain of being, with some entities perceived as more than human
and some perceived as less than human. Additionally, there was some evidence
that participants were more likely to rate their ingroup as more than human. This
latter evidence, however, was mixed. Additionally, a measure of a moral
hierarchy (i.e. moral thermometer) was developed and compared to the measures
of humanness and sanctification. Results suggested that this measure captured
parts of both sanctification and humanness and allows one to measure the
perception of a person or group as above or below human along the same scale.
The second study tested the model of fundamentalism that incorporated
ideas from the chain of being. Results indicated that fundamentalists’ perceptions
of an outgroup as violating and threatening religious values lead participants to
dehumanize and support discrimination against the outgroup. Additionally, the
differences between participants ingroup and outgroup on a hierarchy of morality
predicted support for discriminatory public policies. Religious fundamentalism
was related to the perception of the ingroup as more than human. The perceptions
of the ingroup did not relate to group promoting behavior; however,
fundamentalism was a significant and direct predictor of the group promoting
attitudes and behaviors.
Overall these results suggest that a psychology that does not take the
perception of people as more than human into account does not capture the full
range of person perception. Furthermore, some religious ideologies may promote
the view that ones group is more sacred and these beliefs may inspire more
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support for the religious group. While the results presented in this paper did not
fully confirm the theory, they do provide insight into new directions for research
on infra-humanization and religious fundamentalism.
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Study 1 Measures
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Below is a summary of the measures used in Study 1.
We would like to get your feelings about different groups and entities. Your
honest answer is important to us. Please rate the following groups and entities on
a scale from 0 to 100. 100 indicates that you feel very favorable, while 0 indicates
you feel very unfavorable. How do you feel towards:
0--------------------------------------50-------------------------------------100
Very
Neutral
Very
Unfavorable
Favorable
1. [Insert Target Group]

_________

For the following sections you will be asked about your perceptions of a variety
of groups and entities, especially in regards to how you characterize them. Please
use the following scale to complete all of the following items. Remember your
answers are completely anonymous and cannot be linked back to you. Your honest
answer is important to us.
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7
Not at all
Very much
1. To what extent do you characterize [Insert Target Group] with the following
traits?
a. Awesome
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all
Very Much
b. Inspiring
1 2 3
Not at all

4

5

6 7
Very Much

c. Heavenly
1 2 3
Not at all

4

5

6 7
Very Much

d. Sacred
1 2 3
Not at all

4

5

6 7
Very Much

e. Blessed
1 2 3
Not at all

4

5

6 7
Very Much

f. Broadminded
1 2 3 4
Not at all

5

6 7
Very Much

g. Conscientious
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all
Very Much
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h. Humble
1 2 3
Not at all

4

5

6 7
Very Much

i. Disorganized
1 2 3 4
Not at all

5

6 7
Very Much

j. Rude
1 2 3
Not at all

4

5

6 7
Very Much

k. Stingy
1 2 3
Not at all

4

5

6 7
Very Much

2. To what extent do you feel [Insert Target Emotion] towards [Insert Target
Group]?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Very Much
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People think about others in a variety of ways. Please rate the following groups
and entities on a scale from 0 to 100. 100 indicates that you perceive the group or
entity as the ultimate good, while 0 indicates you perceive the group or entity as
the ultimate evil. How do you perceive:
1. [Insert Target Group]

_________

Ultimate
Good

100

50

Ultimate
Evil

0
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Appendix B
Study 2 Measures
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Below is a summary of Study 2 measures. Previously used and validated scales
are indicated by the name of the scale and its citation in brackets.
Please rate your agreement/disagreement with the following statements regarding
your view of religion. Use the following scale. Remember your answers are
completely anonymous and there is no way to connect your answers back to you.
1------------2------------3------------4--------------5------------6------------7
strongly disagree

strongly agree

[Religious Fundamentalism Scale—Short: Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004]
Please answer the following questions about your religious behaviors. Remember
your answers are completely anonymous and there is no way to connect your
answers back to you.
1. Approximately how much money did you donate to a religious cause in the
last year (congregation, missions, temple, etc.)?
______ dollars
2. On average, how many hours a week do you spend volunteering or working
for your religious group?
______ hours per week
3. In the past year, approximately how many hours have you spent talking to
others about your faith?
______ hours
4. On average, how often do you attend religious services?
<1> More than once a week
<2> Once a week
<3> Once a month
<4> Only on special holy days
<5> Once a year
<6> Less than once a year
<7> Never, practically never
5. How often do you pray or commune with God outside of religious
services?
<1> Every day
<2> More than once a week
<3> Once a week
<4> At least once a month
<5> Several times a year
<6> Less than several times a year
<7> Never, practically never
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Please rate your agreement/disagreement with the following statements regarding
your experiences with life and religion. Please use the following scale.
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7
strongly disagree

strongly agree

[Religious Well-Being Scale: Ellison, 1983]
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or
disagree with each according to your beliefs and experiences. Use the following
scale.
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7
strongly disagree

strongly agree

[Need for Closure Scale: Webster & Kruglanski, 1994]
For the following section you will be asked about your perceptions of a variety of
groups, especially in regards to their descriptions. Please use the following scale.
Remember your answers are completely anonymous. You honest answer is
important to us.
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7
Not at all

Very much

1. To what extent do you characterize [Insert Target Group] with the
following traits?
a. Awesome
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all

b. Inspiring
1 2 3

Very Much

4

5

Not at all

c. Heavenly
1 2 3

4

5

Not at all

d. Sacred
1 2 3

4

5

6 7
Very Much

4

5

Not at all

f. Broadminded
1 2 3 4
Not at all

6 7
Very Much

Not at all

e. Blessed
1 2 3

6 7
Very Much

6 7
Very Much

5

6 7
Very Much
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g. Conscientious
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all

h. Humble
1 2 3

4

5

Not at all

5

Not at all

6 7
Very Much

3

4

5

Not at all

k. Stingy
1 2 3
Not at all

6 7
Very Much

i. Disorganized
1 2 3 4
j. Rude
1 2

6 7
Very Much

6 7
Very Much

4

5

6 7
Very Much

[Moral Thermometer: Same as Study 1]
Please rate your agreement/disagreement with the following statements regarding
Christians, Gays, and Blacks/African Americans. Use the following scale.
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7
strongly disagree

strongly agree

______Typically, [Insert Target Group] do not uphold the values of my
religion.
______ Typically, [Insert Target Group] disagree with the teachings of my
religion.
______ Typically, [Insert Target Group] do not uphold the traditions of my
religion.
______ Typically, [Insert Target Group] threaten the vision of my religion.
______ [Insert Target Group] threaten the expression of my religion.
For this next section we are interested in your attitudes and opinions towards a
variety of social issues. Please answer the following questions.
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7
strongly oppose

strongly support

______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure to
substantially increase federal spending in support of the civil rights of AfricanAmericans/Blacks.
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure to
substantially decrease federal spending in support of the civil rights of AfricanAmericans/Blacks.
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______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure to
substantially increase federal spending in support of the civil rights of Gays.
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure to
substantially decrease federal spending in support of the civil rights of Gays.
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure that
would legalize gay marriage and would allow same-sex married couples all the
same benefits of heterosexual married couples, including tax and insurance
benefits.
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: A constitutional
amendment that will define marriage as something that can exist only between
a man and a woman.
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: Laws designed to protect
gay people from discrimination in the work place.
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: Employers should not be
forced to hire a gay person in that profession if they do not want to.
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: Laws designed to restrict
gay people from adopting children.
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Footnotes
1

The degrees of freedom contain decimal points because linear mixed-

models utilized slightly different calculations for the degrees of freedom than
traditional general linear models.

